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ABSTRACT

The Effects of Mortgage Debt on Assets and Total
Reso urces Among Near-Ret irement
Households

by

Lance Palmer, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2004

Major Professor: Dr. Jean M. Lown
Department: Fami ly, Consumer, and Human Development

The purpose of this study was to investigate the long-tenn relation between
household leverage through the use of mortgages, and changes in household wea llh
using the theoretical framework of the life cycle income hypothesis . The results of
this sltldy are relevant to current position s regarding househo ld leverage via
mortgages. This study used the 1992 through 2002 waves of the Health and
Retirement Study. The characteristics of leveraged and unl everaged households were
compared in 1992 and 2002 as were changes during that period. The relation between
household leverage and changes in assets and total resources over the period was
modeled using robust regression analysis.
Based on the results of independent 1 tests and chi-square tests, there were
statistically significant differences between leveraged and unleveraged households.
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The general difference between the two groups was that greater proportions of
leveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002 than unleveraged households.
This observation was supported by differences in household income, work status
trends, age of household head , total resources, and changes in total resources.
Unleveraged households had stat isti cal ly significantl y higher assets than leveraged
households; however, there was no statistically significant difference in the change in
assets between the two groups.
Retained or incurred mortgage debt during the study period , relative to not
hav ing mortgage debt, had a consistent negative effect on changes in assets and total
reso urces. The in itial leverage ratio and square of the initial leverage ratio were not
sta ti sti cally significant in either of the estimated regress ion models. The effect of
el iminating mortgage debt, relative to not having mortgage debt, on changes in assets
and total resources was not statistically different from zero.
From the standpoint of maximi zi ng resources, maintaining mortgage debt did
not appear to be the best altemative for most households. However, for high-income
and more risk-tolerant households, mortgage debt was benefi cial and enhanced
increases in assets and total resources. Wh il e the use of mortgage debt for investment
capital had th e potential to increase total resources, household s may have derived
greater satisfaction from using the mortgage proceeds for consumption, given their
preferences and expectat ions. Implications for consumers, financial professionals,
educators, and tax policymakers were drawn from the resu lts of the study.
(168 pages)
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CHAPTER I
lNTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Consumers looking for financial advice regarding mortgage debt and
hou sehold leverage find contradicting op inions in both th e popular and professional
press. Many in the financial community argue that mortgage debt, with its low cost
and favorable tax treatment, provid es excellent capi tal for investing. Others counter,
arguing that debt is debt and the interest rate charged on mortgage debt is a high
hurdle for the average ri sk-averse investor to overcome (Goff & Cox , 1998; Onnan,
n.d .; Stonns, 2000; Tomlinson, 2002).
The lack of a consensus among financial wri ters and planners has left
consumers without a clear underswnding of whether mortgage debt, aside from the
purchase of a home, can be beneficial in a househo ld 's financial portfolio. This
question has been approached from a th eoretical perspective using Monte Carlo
simulations and other bootstrap stat istical models (Palmer, 2002; Tom lin son, 2002),
and also from a practitioner's perspective with the use of case studi es and
hypothet ical scenarios (Goff & Cox, 1998; Stonns, 1996, 2000). Both methods
inadequately address the long-tem1 consequences of household leverage through
mortgage use, si nce neither method addresses actu al household behavior, nor provides
a means for a retrospective ana lysis of the decision.

An actual examinat ion of leveraged and unleveraged households is necessary
to understand their behavior and whether either circumstance yields positive
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economic benefits to the household . There is an absence of empirical studies
examining which types of househo ld s choose to maintain mortgage debt and which
choose to pay it off and whether there are lon g-tem1 implications associated with the
deci sion. These contradictions and missing aspects of the current literature regarding
household leverage via mortgage debt highlight the importance of empirical analysis
of th e household leverage decision .
This study examines the characteristics of leveraged and unleveraged
households and estimates the long-tem1 financial consequences of maintaining or
eliminating mortgage debt. Based on the findings of this research, general
recommendations to consumers may be mad e based on the experiences of consumers
in general, rather than derived from spec ific or hypothetical scenarios or case studies
in which the variability of th e situati on and outcome are controlled . The findings of
this st udy may also have implications regarding the appropriateness of the current tax
code which provides househo lds with an incentive to hold mortgages over other forms
of debt , and makes limi ted di st inction between mortgages used to purchase or
improve a home and mortgages used to leverage a financial portfolio or increase
current consumption.

Trends in Mortgage Debt

For many Americans, home ownership is considered a fundamental part of the
American Dream. The Census Bureau reported that 66.2% of U.S. households, or
approximately 69.8 million households, owned their home in 2000 (United States

Census Bureau, n.d.). Home ownership rates have generally been climbing over the
past two decades, and the current home ownership rate foll ows that same trend .
Efficient cred it markets are advantageous to co nsumers, allowing them to shift
reso urces between periods by borrowing in order to smooth their consumption over
time . Modem mortgage finance in the Uni ted States, which allows indi viduals to
borrow large amounts of money and repay it over several decades, is a resu lt of
utiliz ing the effici ency of secondary financial markets through the sale of mortgagebacked securities. For the average household, these market effic iencies make home
ownership possible. At the close of2001, total mo11gage debt in th e United States
was approximately $5.4trilli on and total consumer debt was $ 1. 7 trillion. To give
some perspective to these amoun ts, total cOivo rate debt in the United States at the end
of2001 was $4.8 trilli on (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2003).
As the number of home owners has increased, aggregate mortgage debt, or
money borrowed against the value of an ind ividua l's residence, has also increased.
Not on ly has aggregate mortgage debt increased, bu t the proportion of households
with mortgage debt has also increased. ln 1992, only 39.1% of household s had any
mortgage debt. By 2001 thi s number had risen to 44.6%, an increase of 14.1%.
Mortgage debt during the same peri od, measured in 200 1 dollars, increased from
$3.57 trilli on in 1992 to $5.39trillion in 200 1, or 50.9% (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 2003). Home ownership over the sam e time period
increased only 6.0%, w hich is less than hal f th e rate of growth in households with
mortgage debt, suggesting that a greater proportion of households were borrowing via
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mortgage debt (Ai zcorbe, Kenni ckell, & Moore, 2003). Yelde (2002) noted that the
increase in household debt has been accompanied by an increase in household assets,
suggesting that hou seholds may be purchasing assets with a portion of their
borrowings, or household assets are ri sing independent of household debt as a resul t
of the strong economy during the 1990s.

Borrower incentives

During the late 1990s and earl y years o f the 2000s, mortgage interest rates
were at or near historical lows. These low interest rates provided consumers with
ample incenti ves to refinance existi ng mot1gage loans or take on new mortgages.
Home owners not only benefi tted from low interest rates during the 1990s, they also
benefitted from significant apprec iati o n ofhome values which resu lted in large
increases in home equity. The combination of low interest rates and rapid
appreciation of home values led many home owners to cash out some of their equity
through refinancing, additional mortgages, or home equity lines of credit. By
refinancing, home owners could potentially cash-out some of their accumulated equity
and simul taneously lower their monthly paymen t (Coy & Keenan, 2003).
As Velde (2002) suggested, some of th e money obtained through refinancing
and lower monthly payments was likely used to purchase assets. Another asset likely
invested in, but not accounted for directly, is human capital resulting from education,
relocation, and additional job training. IJ1 addit ion to accum ulating assets, much of the
cashed-out equity was consumed . Eco nomic observers noted that the recent economic
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down tum was miti gated by strong consumer spending, as a resu lt of liquidating home
equity. In 2002, approx im ately $200 billion was generated from cash-out refinancing,
$350 billion (net of mortgage repayment) from equity conversion through home sales,
and $ 130 billion from home equity lin es of cred it (Gree nspan, 2003). Greenspan
reponed that approximately half of the $200 billi on obtained from cash-out
refinancing was invested in th e borrower's residence or other investments.
Jn addition to the incent ive of low interest rates, the tax system in the United
States a llows ho usehold s that item ize th eir deductions to include mortgage interest in
th eir income tax deduction calculation. Mortgage interest is deductible when the
household has ite mi zed ded uct ions in excess of the standard deduction . According to
the Un it ed States Department of the Treasury (1 996), 30% of hou seholds itemi zed
their deducti ons in 1996 and potentially rece ived a tax benefit from mortgage interest
ded ucti ons. For those who itemize, thi s deduction reduces the after-tax cost of
mortgage debt by the amount of excess deduction resulting from the mortgage interest
multip li ed by the borrower' s marginal tax rate. This has the potenti al o f creati ng an
artifici a ll y low cost of debt for some households. This favorable tax treatment of
mortgage interest encourages househo ld s to hold more mortgage debt than they
otherw ise would . Consequ ently, many househo lds have reallocated their debt
portfoli os to increase their mortgage debt and reduce other forms of debt (Dunsky &
Follain, 2000; Stango, 1999). However, th e trading of un secured for secured debt may
make households more v ulnerable to changes in income and consequently the risk of
foreclosure and possibly bankruptcy (Su llivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2000).
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Nonetheless, some financial planners argue that households should strongly
consi der carryi ng a mortgage and invest any add itional money-that would otherwise
be paid towards earl y reti rement of the loan- in investment s that yi eld a hi gher aftertax rate ofretum th an the interest rate paid on th e mortgage after taxes (Edelman,
200 1; Johnston, 2000; Storms, 2000). This woul d enhance the fi nancial wealth of

individuals and in tum may increase the ir overa ll life ti me consumption. This strategy
is not wi thout ri sk, since investment ret ums are un certai n while mortgage paym ents
are certain. Furthermore, mortgages are generall y secured by th e indi vidual 's primary
resi dence, making the choice to carry a mortgage for investment purposes a
potenti all y emotional decision.

Recommendmions by Financial Professionals

Fi nancial planners appear to be divided regarding the use of mortgages to
leverage household s. Many feel that households should not carry mortgages into
retirement whil e others persuasively argue th at even households in retirement would
be well -served by utilizing mort gages to tap into their home equity and obtain lowcost investment capital to diversify th eir assets (Ed elman, 2001 ; Johnston, 2000;
Stom1s, 1996, 2000; Tomlinson, 2002). Financial authors readily acknowl edge that
the household 's decision to carry mortgage debt is also affected by the household 's
attitud e towards ri sk and debt.
Household debt and access to credit create a choice for consumers regarding
how resources are saved for future peri ods such as retirement. For households that

7
currently carry a mortgage, unleveraging themselves, or paying off mortgage debt
ahead of scheduled payments, is an effective method of saving for consumption in
future periods. The rate of retum eamed on the money used to prepay the debt equals
the interest rate charged on the borrowed fund s. Many households choose to become,
or remain , unleveraged, or debt-free. According to the 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances (The Federal Reserve Board , 2003), 21 % of households with fixed rate
mo11gages are ahead of their mortgage amorti zation schedule (author's calculations).
On the other hand , household s may choose to carry mortgage debt, or leverage
themselves, so that they can have greater investment capital or a more diversified
portfolio. These households choose not to prepay mongages, but rather make
minimum payments on the loan or increase their ctment mongage, to take advantage
of low-cost investment capital and to potentially increase their portfolio 's
diversification. These households use tax-advantaged mortgage debt to leverage and
diversify their assets in the hopes of realizing greater financial retums.
When evaluating the choice to le verage or unleverage an individual's assets
wi th a mortgage, a common and popular comparison used is the historical retum on
equ ity investments versus th e investor ' s current interest rate on their mortgage. While
this is a convenient comparison, most investors experience rates of retum below
historica l market rates ofretum, nullifying th e appropri ateness of this comparison
(Dalbar, Inc., 200 I).
According to a recent study by Dalbar, Inc. (as cited in Clements, 2004), the
average annual return on equity mutual funds for the 19 years ending December 2002
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was I I .8%. However, over that same period the average amJUal return realized by
equity mutual fund in vestors was only 2.6%. The reason cited for this large disparity
was mutual fund owners' relatively short holding period of the mutual funds,
approximately 2.6 years. Dalbar, lnc. (2001) suggested that mutual fund investors
appeared to be switching between funds frequently, rather than employing a long-term
buy-and-hold strategy. However, Dalbar's findings may be subject to debate.
C lem ents pointed out a bias in Dalbar's methodology which, when corrected,
increased annual investor returns to 8.2% and reduced th e gap between actual investor
returns and the markets perforn1ance to 3.4 percentage points. Under the revised
methodology, individual investors appeared to perform better, yet sti ll lagged behind
the overall market.
Compari sons using the hi storical rate of return in the equ ity market to current
mortgage rates are also inappropriate because the average investor does not allocate

100% of their portfolio to stocks. Waggle and Johnso n (2003) examined optimal
portfolio allocations using a mean variance analysis and expected utility model and
found th at the optimal pot1folio allocation for moderately ri sk-averse households with
signifi cant mortgage debt does not include a substantia l allocation to stocks. For
househo lds wi th a high loan to va lue ratio and relatively modest financial asset
holdings, optimal portfolios included as little as I 2% equity allocation.
Historical rates of return on equities, such as those published by Ibbotson
Associates (2002), are calculated using broad market indices based on a buy-and-hold
strategy. Given the major difference between mutual fund investors' behavior and the
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method for calcul ating hi storical rates of ret um, it does not seem appropriate for
individ ual investors to use his torica l rates of return on equ ities to compare mortgage
prepayment versus investing- unless the in vestor has consistently used a buy-andho ld strategy and invested the majority of hi s or her assets in a market representative
portfo lio of equities.

Sign ifi cance of the Study

Consumers looking for financ ial advice regarding mortgage debt and
household leverage find contradicting opini ons on how and when it should be used.
F inancia l writers' and planners ' clashing opinions have left consumers with no clear
consensus on the appropriate cou rse of acti on. Financi al w riters and pl ann ers have
exp lored thi s topic wi th a vari ety of analyses and perspectives, including bootstrap
modeling, case studies, and hypothetical scenarios (Goff & Cox, 1998; Palmer, 2002;
Storn1s, 1996, 2000; Tomlinson, 2002). However, th ese approaches fail to add ress the
lo ng- tenn consequences of using mortgages on primary res idences for leverage
beca use they ignore actual hou sehold behavior. These methods also fail to provide a
means for retrospective analysis of the decision.
Empirical studies are necessary to examine how househo lds behave wi th
regard to househo ld leverage, and which altern atives provide the household w ith the
greatest economic well-being. There is an absence of empi rical studies exam ining
w hi ch types of households leverage themselves and how effective these households
are in achieving greater financial retums. Furthennore, general recommendations to
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consumers may best be made based on the experiences of consumers in general, and
not derived from specific hypothetical scenarios and case studies, which limit the
variabi lity of the indi vidual's environmeni. These shortcom ings in the current
literature regarding household leverage th rough mortgage debt underscore th e need for
empirical analysis of the hou seho ld leverage decision.

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study is to investigate the Jong-tenn relation between
household leverage, through the use of mortgages, and changes in household wealth .
The results of this study w ill support or refute current positions regarding household
leverage via mortgages. The findin gs w ill also have implications for the current tax
code which provides households an incent ive to hold mortgages over other forms of
debt and makes lim it ed distinction between mortgages used to purchase or improve a
home, to leverage a financia l portfolio, or increase current consumption.
The speci fie objectives of this study are:
I. To compare and contrast the characteristi cs (i.e., debt, assets, income,
portfo lio allocation, and demographics) of leveraged households (househo lds
wit h mortgage debt) and unl everaged household s (households without
mortgage debt) in I 992 and 2002,
2. To iden tify factors contributing to th e change in the household 's assets and
total resources during the period from 1992 to 2002, and
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3. To discuss the general implications of mongage debt for consumers,
fina ncial professionals, educators, and tax policymakers.
A review of lit erature was cond ucted and appropriate theories and findings are
identified and discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 develops a theoreti ca l and conceptual
model for the ana lysis and also identifies the empirical model used for data analysis.
The data for this study was the 1992 through 2002 data sets of the Health and
Retirement Study. Chapter 4 discusses the resu lts of th e empiri cal analysis and
Chapter 5 di sc usses the resu lts and implications that can be drawn from them.
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CHAPTER 2
REVJEW OF LITERATURE

Theoreti cal Research

The review of literature is divided into two main sections. Th e first secti on
inc ludes th eoretical research addressing why people save and accumulate resources
and the concept of financial leverage. The second sec tion discusses empirica l
research find ings regarding the accumul at ion of and changes in wealth, household
borrowing behavior, and hou sehold response to tax incentives. The theoretical and
empiri ca l findings will lead into hypotheses regarding whether househo lds e ffectively
use tax-advantaged mortgage debt in order to ach ieve greater resources avail able for
consumpti on.

Life Cycle In come Hypothesis

How and why hou sehold s save has long been a central point of interest among
economi sts because indi vidu al savings yield aggregate savings which fom1 s the
supply of capita l, and hence contributes vi tally to an economy's producti vity
(Modigl iani, 1986). Current theori es on savings behavior begin with Keynes (1965)
who orig in all y hypothesized:
The fu nd amental psychological law .. is that men are disposed, as a
rule and on average, to increase their consumpti on as their incom e
increases, but not as much as the increase in their income (p. 96).
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According to Modigliani (1986), the prevailing motive to save a ponion of
income under Keynes' theory was to enable the indi vi dual to bequeath an estate to hi s
or her heirs. Keynes' theory, f01malized as the Consumption Function, does well in
exp laining the differences between the savings rate of sim ilar families with different
incomes. However, as Bryant (1990) pointed o ut, it fails to explain the consistency of
the national savings rate during periods of substant ial real income growth.
As a result of the Consumption Function's shoncomi ngs, new theories were
introduced. In 1949, Duesenberry introduced what came to be known as the Relative
Income Hypothesis. Duesenberry hypothesized that consumption is detem1ined
largely by the behavior of one's soc ial class and that as real incomes increase,
individua l social class also increases, resulting in greater expend itures to matc h one's
peers in the newly-atta ined social circle. Later, Friedman (1957) introduced the
Pem1anent Income Hypothesis, while at the same time, Modigliani and Brumberg

(1954) introduced the found ation of the life cycle income hypothesis. The Pennanent
Income Hypothesis and the life cycle income hypothesis are very si milar regarding
savings and consumption. The key difference between the two is that Friedman based
his model on income in perpetuity, or an indefini te life span, with the corpus goi ng to
th e individual's heirs, while Modigliani and Brumberg's life cycle income hypothesis
is based upon the assumption that consumption and saving behavior are based on the
resources available during the life span and th erefore the income available for
consumption !lowing from those resources is finite and exhausted over the life span
(Modigliani, 1986).
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According to the life cycle income hypothesis (Ando & Modigliani, 1963)
individuals seek to smooth their consumpt ion over their life by borrowing and saving
at different stages of the life cycle, thu s affecting the househo ld 's current portfolio of
assets, debts, and net worth. The fundamen tal idea of the life cycle income hypothesis
is that individuals base their consumption on total life resources and not on current
income. Total resources include current net worth, current income, and the present
va lu e of future earned income. From these resources, a pennanent income flow is
estim ated and the individual's consumpti on, a proxy for utility or sat isfaction, is based
on this permanent flow of income. As mentioned above, Friedman's (1957)
Perrnanent In come Hypothesis treated permanent income as the incom e that could be
generated indefinitely from th e stock of resources, whereas Modigli ani and
Brumberg's (1954) life cycle income hypothesis treated pennanent income more
along the lines of an annuitized income stream that could be generated from the stock
of total life resources for a finite life span.
Hanna, Fan, and Chang (1995), used the life cycle income hypothesis to
hypothetically model hou sehold consumption and net worth over the adult years.
U nder circumstances of rising real income, their model predicted that rational
consumers wou ld borrow to increase consumption in early years, repay the borrowed
funds, and then accumulate wealth. Hanna et al. made the simplifying assumption that
individuals can borrow and save at the same interest rate. Modigliani (1986) also
points to the "hump shape" of wealth accumulation based on the life cycle income
hypothesis, namely that households borrow, save, and spend down wea lth during
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retirement. One result of this hump shape of wealth is that individuals will have debt
at a time when they begin saving. lfthe interest rate on debt and savings is the same,
as is the case in Hanna and colleagues' (1995) model, then it makes no difference
whether the ind ividual saves through debt repayment or through separate savings.
Modigliani does not focus on the cost of debt in his discussion, only the real interest
rate on savi ngs, hypothesi zing that it may have no effect on the savings of individuals,
or will encourage them to postpone some consumption now for greater consumpt ion
in th e future resulting from the positive savi ngs rate.

In reality, individuals face a multitude of interest rates when borrowing and
saving and often find that, as a result, there is a difference in the rate at which funds
can be borrowed, and saved or invested. The differences in interest rates may lead
individuals to simultaneous borrowing and saving, by maintaining relatively low-cost
debt and saving transitory income (the difference between current income and
perm anent income) in higher yielding accounts.

Financial Leverage

The idea of creat ing wealth through borrowi ng at low interest rates and
invest ing at higher rates ofretum has been ex tens ive ly exp lored in corporate finance
literature. Financ ia l leverage, or the amount of debt fi nancing re lative to assets, has
been thought to boost the profitability and the residual worth of corporations .
Generally speaking, investors demand a higher rate of retum on stocks than they do on
corporate bonds because stockholders are the last ones to get paid in good and bad
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times. Bondholders always come first. Because bondholders require a lower rate of
retum, in the past there was a consensus among financial researchers and
professiona ls that some debt, due to its lower cost, made good bu sin ess sense (Myers,
200 1). However, about the same time that Modigli an i was fomlU lating the life cyc le
inco me hypothes is, he and Merton Miller published The Cost of Capital, C01porate

Finance, and the TheOIJ' of Investment (1958) which changed the way econom ists
thought about debt-enhancing corporate wealth.
Mod ig li ani and Miller ( 1958) showed that the value of a corporation is
independent of how the corporation is financed. Based on the assumpti on of perfect
cap it al markets, they showed that th e corporation's total value is based on its assets '
underlying value, which equals the sum valu e of all of its outstanding sec urities. The
proportion of debt to equi ty financing is iiTelevant to the business' value. Modi gliani
and Mi ller showed that if a corporation were to issue debt, then the market would
d isco unt the corporation's stock because bond ho ld ers ' payments (interest and
principa l) would take precedence over payments to stock holders. Modi gliani and
Mill er showed that the discount placed on the stock, e.g., the higher rate of return
demanded by th e stockhold ers, was equal to th e savings resulting from the lower-cost
debt. This net effect resulted in no change in the total val ue of the corporation.
ln spite ofMod igl ian i and Miller's (1958) findings , the debate over optimal
amounts of debt and equi ty in corpo rate fi nance continues mainly because
imperfections ex ist in the capita l markets. The original theory ass um ed imperfections
do not exist. Modigliani and Miller noted that when the tax code is taken into
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consideration, some exploitation can be achieved through an optimal balance of debt
and equity. However, they concluded that the benefi t is minimal.

Tradeoff Th eory

Myers (2001) reviewed the three main theories (tradeoff, pecking order, and
free cash now) relating fim1 value with its capital structure. Only the tradeofftheory
is relevant to this research . The tradeoff theory takes into account the fact that the tax
code allows corporations to deduct in terest payments as a cost of doing business. The
value of debt is equal to the present value of the future stream of payments assoc iated
wi th it. If a corporation were to maintain the same level of debt indefi nitely, then the
deb t's va lue is eq ual to the presen t val ue of th e interest payment s d iscounted at the
debt's coupon interest rate (Modi gli ani & Miller, I 958). Since the interest is taxdeductible, and assum ing the marginal tax rate of the corporation is 35%, the aft er-tax
costs of the interest paym ents are p(J - 0. 35) where p is the payment. The value of the
debt then fa ll s to D(J- 0.35). Myers il lustrates the potential va lue of this tax savings
to shareholders by show ing that if a corporation borrows $ 1 milli on, w ith the intent to
ho ld th e debt ind efinit ely, and repurchases outstandin g stock worth $ 1 milli on, then
the value of the corporation has not changed. However, if the interest on the debt is
tax-ded uctib le th en th e debt 's cost to the corporati on is onl y $650,000, and the stock
and bondholders of th e corporation have received an increase in thei r hold ings' value
of $350,000.
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Based on this illustration, tradeoff theory states, "that the fim1 will borrow up
to the point where the marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just offset by
the in crease in the present value of possible costs of financial distress" (Myers, 2001,
pp. 88-89). ln other words, the corporation wi ll borrow to the point that the financial
risks associated with debt, such as bankruptcy and higher required rates of return by
stockholders, equal the benefits gai ned.
individuals likewise reap benefits from borrowed funds, mongage debt in
panicular, and can also experience financial distress, such as foreclosure and
bankruptcy (Sullivan et al., 2000). There are limited th eoretical or empirical studi es
directly related to individual capital structure, or the combinat ion of personal savings
and borrowed money, and wealth creation. However, several st udi es have exam in ed
how ri sk tol erance and other hou seho ld characteristics affect wealth accumulation,
what types of consumers have a greater tendency to incur debt, and how households
respond to changes in the tax code regard ing interest deductions.

Empirical Research

Wealth

A household's ponfolio of assets and debts changes over the life cycle.
Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1997) analyzed changes in househo ld wea lth to
detem1ine what factors were most influential. They found that age, income, initial
wealth, receiving an inheritance, having a regular savings plan, and living in a
metropol itan area were statistically significant positi ve indicators of changes in
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wea lth. IJ1 o rd er to maintain an exogenous relationship between initi al wea lth and
changes in household wealth , the researchers used the hou sehold 's wealth percentile
in place of actual initial measu res of wealth, which would be part oft he independent
variable.
The authors acknowledged that thei r model only accounted for. 4 to 6% of the
variab ility in changes in weal th . Similar to other studies, Kennickell and

Starr~

McCluer (1 997) found that househo lds' behavior was consistent with the life cycle
hypothesis: debt was most frequen tly incurred among yo ung households, and then
eliminated among middle-aged hou seholds. Net worth also appeared to peak around
age 55 and th en declin ed for o ld er age

~,'Toups .

However, the decline was relatively

small.

Health
Recent research on the relation between health and wealth has high lighted a
strong correlation between the two (Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, & Ribeiro,
2003; Grossman, 1973; Meer, Mill er, & Rosen, 2003). An early study by Grossman
found that differences in se lf-reported health were inversely related to th e number of
work weeks missed. The lost productivity resu lted in an immediate loss in wages.
Poor hea lth also decreased the cumul ative experience, training, and working years;
thu s, diminishing human wealth (Bryant, 1990).
Meer et al. (2003), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
instrumen tal variab le methodologies, showed th at the dominant path is from health to
wealth rather than from weal th to health, especially over short term periods. A
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stati sti call y significant relati on from wealth to health was also found. However, the
magnitude of the effect was very small and when the effect was controlled for through
instrum ental variables, it was no longer statisticall y significant.
Adams et al. (2003) al so arrived at simil ar conclusions using the Asset and
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) . They fo und no evidence between
wealth and mortality or the sudden onset of acute disease. However, there was .
evi dence that wealth affected the incidence of menta l and psychological probl ems.
Findings regarding wealth and chron ic and other illnesses were mixed. Adams et al.
did find evidence of a causa l link from health conditions to total wealth changes. The
effect of health on wea lth appears to be cons istently establi shed in the lit erature, while
th e effect of wea lth on hea lth , res ult s in insignificant, m ixed, or unsubstanti al effects.

Portfolio AllocGfion
Spencer and Fan (2002) suggested that a househo ld 's wi llingness to incur debt
is depend ent upon its risk tolerance. Risk tolerance is also an important aspect of
wea lth accum ulat ion because it is a major determ inant of how an individual' s
portfolio is allocated among different assets, and thus determines the assets' rate of
ret um (G utter, 2000). H istori cally, stocks have experienced rates of return
approximately twice as hi gh as bond s and a greater allocation towards stocks would
likel y result in greater overa ll returns (Ibbotson Associates, 2002). Several stud ies
have exami ned the det erminants of risk tolerance (Grabl e & Lytton, 1998; Schooley &
Worden, 1996; Sung & H anna, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997).
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The most consistent household and demographic factors that are positively
associated with risk tolerance are net worth, education, being married, being nonHispanic White, and not being retired (Grable & Lytton, 1998; Schooley & Worden,
1996; Sung & Hanna, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997). Other less-consisten t factors
positively associated with risk tolerance included being self-employed and male
(Grable & Lytton; Sung & Hanna). Income was only found to be a statistically
significant factor in Grab le and Lytton's study. Health was negatively correlated with
risk tolerance and was only included in Wang and Hanna's model.
T he effect of risk tolerance and portfolio allocation on wealth accumulation is
most eviden t in Gutter's (2000) st udy. Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,
Gutter classi lied households as either willi ng or unwilling to take investment risk.
Household s that were willing to take financial ri sks were found to have approximately
3.5 times higher net worth than hou seholds not willing to take investment risks.
Gutter also classifi ed households based on whet her they owned risky assets. Gutter
(2000) defined risky assets to be items such as "ownership of stocks or small
businesses" (p. 13).

Households that owned risky assets had an average net worth 5

times greater than households that did not own risky assets .

1 tests

comparing the 2

groups showed statistica ll y signifi can t differences with p < 0.0001. Gutter's findings,
while cross-sectional, provide strong evidence that a household's risk tolerance and
portfolio al location are influential factors affect ing wealth accumulation .
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lmergenerationa/ Transfers
Kotlikoffand Summer's (1981) work argued that the stock of U.S. wealth
resulting from intergenerational transfers, name ly inheritances and bequests,
rep resen ted the majority of assets held by U.S. households. They estimated that 80%
of the stock of U.S. wealth was a result of inheritances from older gen_erations, whi le
on ly 20% was accounted for by current savings consistent with the life cycle income
hypothesis. Modigliani (1986) argued that the amount is much less, and based on a
survey of research results estimates the amount of bequeathed wealth at no more than
25% of househo lds' asset holdings. Modigliani was also critical of Kotlikoff and
Summer's methods and suggests that when estimation errors were corrected, Kot li koff
and Summer's resu lts were consisten t with the 25% figure . Regardi ng either fi gure,
the percent of hou seholds ' assets attributable to bequests were substanti al.
Using the Asset and Health Dynamics Survey, McGarry and Schoeni ( 1997)
found evidence supponing the altruism theory of fam ili al transfers proposed by
Becker ( 198 1). McGarry and Schoeni found that less well-off children were more
likely to receive a transfer from their parents and that the amount of the transfer was
larger than transfers to better-off siblin gs. No ev id ence was found in th e study
supponi ng exchange th eory.
McGarry (1999) also found that transfers made by parents when li vi ng, were
disproponionately made to less well-off children, however, bequests made at death
were regularly d istributed equally among all children. McGarry proposed that livi ng
transfers were made based on the chi ld 's current incom e, whereas bequests at death
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were made based on the child's pennanent income. Chang (2004), summ ari zing
current literature regarding intergenerati ona l transfers also notes that inter-vivos
tran sfers were unequally di stribut ed among children w hil e bequests at death were
equally di stributed, consistent with McGmry's conclu sions. Chang also noted a
common findin g was that th e recipient's earn ings and transfers were positively
related. This common findin g provides no support for Becker's (1981) Rotten Kid
Theorem.
Consistent w ith Chang's (2004) summary, Kao, Hong, and Widdows (1997)
found that individuals who had more education were more likel y to expect to receive
an inheritance. lndividuals who were married, Whi te, with living parents, and
reporting higher re lative health were also more lik ely to expect to receive an
inheritance. On th e other hand, individuals w ith large non-liquid holdings, who were
middle-aged, marri ed, and had fewer chi ldren had hi gher expectations of bequeathing
assets.

Borrower Characrerisrics
While int erest rates, asset pri ces, and tax incentives affect the household's
willingness to botTow, other demographic factors are also import ant. Households with
outstanding debt were more likely to be single-headed households, younger, nonWhite, home owners, employed, have less fonnal ed ucation, higher income, lower net
worth, and larger household sizes (Chen & Jensen, 1985 ; Crook , 2001; Salandro &
Harrison, 1997; Spencer & Fan, 2002; Zhu & Meeks, 1994). Maki (1995) had similar
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results except that married household and more educated households were more likely
to carry greater amounts ofmongage debt. The fin ding that debt declines later in life
is consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis and is also found in studies
examining hou sehold debt holdings. Zhu and Meeks, using the 1983 to 1986 panel
data of the Survey o f Consumer Finances, found that employment and educational
attainmen t were positively associated with outstanding credit balances while age was
negatively associated wi th outstanding debt.
Spencer and Fan (2002) examined simultaneous debtors and savers and their
savi ng motives. Using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, Spencer and Fan
report that 54.7% of their sampl e were simultaneo us debtors and savers .
Approxim ately 40% of simultaneo us debtors and savers reported a savings motive
consistent with the Ii fe cycle income hypothesis. An additional 33 .7% of
simu ltaneous debtors and savers have precautionary savings motives. Precautionary
savi ngs are for emergencies, iII ness, or unemployment. Precautionary savings are not
incorporated into the life cycle income hypothesis in a direct sense. However, in the
sense that o ld age brings about unemp loyment (retirement), illness, and unexpected
expenses, these costs are included indirectly as one ages, but not for younger
households.
Other studies have focu sed specifically on hou seholds that borrow against the
value of their home. Hou seho lds most likely to use home equity credit lines are
middle-aged and younger, have larger household size, shoner ownership tenure, fewer
assets and lower ne t wonh, and lower income (Chen & Jensen, 1985; Salandro &
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Harrison, 1997). Chen and Jensen also noted that the combi nation o f being single and
ret ired is stat isti cally signi ficantly related to home eq uity use, whil e non-retired
households were more li kely to use home equ ity if they were marri ed. A lso, lowincome(< $ 12,500, 1983 do ll ars) and high-income (> $25 ,000, 1983 doll ars) famili es
were more lik ely to use home equ ity compared to mi ddl e-incom e househo lds. Chen
and Jensen speculated that low-income households use home equi ty out of need,
whereas high-income households were more risk tolerant and therefore ut ili zed home
equ ity for consumpt ion convenience. Sa landro and Harrison also fo und income
statisti ca ll y signifi cant but d id not control fo r a curvili near relati onship . In their study,
the amount of home equity was statistically sign ifi cant and the int erest rate was
ins igni fica nt , whil e Chen and Jensen did not cont ro l fo r interest rates. Consistent in
both studies was that higher levels of net wo rt h were associated w ith lower levels of
home eq uity use.
Jones (1 996) found that home equ ity was consumed by the elderl y as a last
reso urce. This is consistent w ith Chen and Jensen's (1 98 5) findin g that retired
ind iv id uals uti lized home equi ty after becoming si ngle. Moreover, liquidity
constraints were not a facto r in the use of home equity (C hen & Jensen; Jones).

Household Demographics

Key demographic variab les, such as marital status and race have been
ident ifi ed by researchers as in Ouenti al detenninants of the household 's risk tolerance,
the propensity to borrow, and wea lt h ho ldings. Marital status is an important
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demograph ic vari ab le to control, because of the greater human capital resulting from
two adults (Bryant, 1990). Retirement savings studies have also documented the
differences in wealth accumul ation between man·ied and single househo ld s (Mitchell,
Moore, & Phillips, 2000; Moore & Mitchell , 2000; Weir & Willis, 2000) and
con sistently show the negative economic effects of divorce. Marital status has also
been found to affect risk tolerance (Grable & Lytton , 1998; Sung & Hanna, 1996;
Wang & Hatma, 1997) as well as borrowing behavior (Chen & Jensen, 1985).
Race has also been found to be correlated with risk tolerance (Grab le &
Lytton, 1998 ; Sung & Hatma, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997). Discrimination in the
labor markets and the resulting negative feedback , also contrib uted to minority ethni c
groups having lower inco mes and often lower educat ion (Becker, 197 1). The
diffi culties minorities experienced during their working years were reflected in their
wealt h at retirement (Honig, 2000; Smith, 1995). Using the Health and Retirement
Study data, Smith found that average and median wealth among White households
was more than double the wealth among Black and Hispanic households. Honig' s
findings are similar, and show large discrepancies in the amount of wealth
accumulated between different racial/ethnic groups .

Household Portfolio Response to Taxation

The 1986 Tax Refonn Act (TRA) provided researchers w ith the opportunity to
investigate household behavior in relation to taxes and debt. Prior to 1986,
households could deduct interest expenses on all consumer debts, including credit
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cards, auto loans, and mortgages. The 1986 TRA phased out the deductibility of nonmortgage interest payments, signifi cantly lowered the marginal tax brackets for
individuals, and increased the standard deduction (Stango, 1999). After the Act
passed , Stango examined how households responded to the phase-out of interest
deductions on non-mortgage debt. Us ing aggregate times series data from 1980
through !991 , Stango estimated that by 1991 cred it card and auto loan debt were
approxim atel y 14% and 9% below what they would have been in the absence of the
tax law change, respectively. Total mortgage debt however, was approximately I%
higher than it wou ld have been. When examining aggregate mortgage debt, the effects
of int erest rates and housing prices dominated the effect of preferential tax treatment
and were co ntroll ed for in Stango's mode l. The per capi ta income and average
marginal tax rate were also stati sti cally significant variables in the estimated model.
Based on anecdotal evidence at the time, Stango believed that much of the debt
shuffling from non-deductib le to deductible forms of debt was facilitated through the
use of home equity credit lines.
Dunsky and Follain (2000) also exam ined the effects of the 1986 TRA using
the Survey of Consumer Finances 1983 to 1989 panel data series and found evidence
of portfolio reshuffling based on tax law changes. Dunsky and Fo ll ain argued that
because the standard deduction increased as pari of the 1986 TRA, the after-tax cost of
mortgage debt also increased because the marginal benefit to itemi zing households
decreased. This was not account ed for in Stango's (1999) analysis. Dunsky and
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Follain found that business owners were less sens itive to increases in the cost of
mortgage debt compared to non-business owners .
Supporting these findings, Crook (2001) found that the maximum household
debt load was observed at incomes of $151 ,461, wh ich was less than the previously
observed relation in 1983 of$173,8 11. One explanation for this is that the after-tax
cost of debt increased between 1983 and 1995 as a result of the 1986 TRA 's
provisions, namely, lower marginal tax rates and increased standard deductions. In
response to the TRA, as Dunsky and Follain (2000) point o ut, households reduced
their overall demand for debt.

In a similar study, Maki (1995, 1996), using successive waves of the
Consu mer Expenditure Survey and panel tax return data, found that portfolio shufning
to take advantage of the 1986 tax law changes was not uniform across all households.
He found that more educated high-income home owners were the only group to show
clear evidence that ded uctibl e mortgage debt was substituted for non-deductible
consumer debt after the 1986 TRA 's imp lementation. Hi gh-income home owners
reduced the interest paid on consumer debt by 36%, whi le increasing the amount of
int erest paid on mortgage debt by 16% from 1987 to 1991. Furthermore, highly
educated high-income renters did not show any evidence of portfolio shufning in
response to the tax law change. In fact , they did not reduce their consumer debt
holdings.
One of the tools cited by Maki (1995) likely used to reallocate debt holdings
was mortgage refinancing. However, other methods of extracting home equity may
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also have been used, such as selling the home and reinvesting only part of the money
into a subsequent home purchase (Engen & Gale, 1997).
The 1986 TRA affected more than just the deductibility of interest debt, it also
affected the deductibility of savings assoc iated with IRAs. New limits and restrictions
were imposed on IRAs that made them comparatively less attractive than 401(k)
plans. Engen and Gale (1997) found that this contributed to a sh ift in households' taxpreferred asset holdings. Prior to the 1986 TRA, IRAs represen ted the majority of
tax -preferred household assets. By 1992, IRAs only represented approximately one
fifth of tax-preferred assets, while 40l(k) holdings accounted for three fourths of taxpreferred ho ldings .
Engen and Gale (1997) examined th e interaction between househo ld debt and
asset holdings subsequent to the 1986 TRA. They found that households who had at
least one worker eligible to participate in a 401 (k) plan increased their financial asset
holdings and accumulated more net financial assets than similar househo lds that did
not participate in a 40l(k) pl an. However, the net wealth (assets minus li abi lities) of
these hou seholds was not greater than those who did not participate in a 40l(k) plan.
The sim il arity in net wealth, although net fin ancial assets were significantly different,
is explained by the fact that 401 (k) plan participants had Jess home equity or greater
li abilities relative to non-participants. When controlling for other factors , Engen and
Gale found that households participating in 401 (k) plans, who also had access to taxadvantaged mortgage debt, appeared to use tax-advantaged mortgage debt to increase
their 40l(k) plan holdings. The increase in 40l(k) assets was offset by a decrease in
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home equity. These households appear to be maximi zi ng the benefits allowed under
the 1986 TRA by using tax-advantaged debt to invest in a tax-deferred asset, thereby
reducing the effecti ve cost of taxes.
Maki (1996) noted that the U.S. Congress' policy goa ls have been frustrated to
a large extent by the portfolio sh uffling ofhigh-income home owners. With the
passage of the 1986 TRA , Congress wanted to reduce the incentive to borrow for
consumer purchases (thereby increasing the national savings rate) and to increase tax
revenu e by approxi mately $10 billion annua ll y by elimin ating consumer interest as a
deductible expense for income tax purposes. Apparently, households do adjust their
holdings of assets and debts, in particular the type of ho lding, to maximi ze tax
savings. However, tax incentives, or disincentives, assoc iated with some form s of
debt do not appear to curtail consumpti on .

Summary

Several theories have been introduced to exp lain household sav ings and
consumption behavior. The two most robust models of household savings are
Friedman's Pem1anent Incom e Hypot hesis and Ando and Modigliani 's (1 963) life
cyc le income hypothesis. The life cycle income hypothesis describes the hou sehold 's
uti lity as a function of consumpt ion over the life span. Consumption in tum is then
based on the availability of th e househo ld 's total resources at any given time during
the life span. The life cycle income hypothesis posits that young househo ld s and
hou seho lds, in whi ch the majority of resources are in the forrn of human capi tal, incur
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debt in order to consume. Later in life, the household pays off the debt and saves for
the later years of life when relatively littl e human capi tal wil l remain and consumpti on
wi ll be det ennined by the household's tangible assets.
As a result of the househo ld having both debt and excess income for savings,
the household must decide which fom1 of savings wi ll maximize futur_e period
consu mpti on- pay down the debt or accumulate the savings in a separate accou!lt.
Some theori es, such as the tradeoff theory, suggest th at low-cost, tax-advantaged debt
shou ld be held or maintained rather than paid off. Such behavior would maximize the
household 's total resources because the government, through favorable tax
regul ati ons, wou ld pay for a por1ion of th e interest expense and the household could
use subsidi zed debt to invest in hi gher yielding investments.
Studies examining household wealth have identified several factors that
contribute to the household's abil ity to accumulate wealth. The age of the household
(consisten t with the life cycle income hypothesis) the household ' s will ingness to take
financ ial ri sks, intergenerati onal transfers in the fonn of bequests and inh eritances,
and hea lth status are all strong determ in ants of the total wealth held by the household.
IJ1come has also been found to affect wea lth accumulat ion; however, its effects are not
consistent across stud ies .
Household borrowing behavior has been found to be cons istent with the life
cycle income hypothesis in th at young households borrow more than older
househo lds, with debt peaking around middl e age and then decreasing into old age.
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There is some evi dence of debt increasing again in old age, particularly housing debt,
aft er other resources have been depleted.
There is limited empirical lit erature regarding the relation of low-cost, taxadvantaged hou sehold debt and changes in household wea lth, as suggested by the
tradeoff theory. Such research wou ld fill in gaps in the current body of literature
relating to wealth accumulation, the use of debt, and savings choices, and would
contri bute to clarifying the implications associated with leveraged household savings.

Hypotheses

The framework for this study was based on the review of literature relating to
th e theory and findings of recen t empirical researc h on wealth and debt holdings of
households. Hypotheses are presented in the following sections based on the review
of theoretical and empirical research.

Household Leverage

This research assumed the framework of the life cycle income hypothesis, in
that households base consumption on the present val ue ofl ife resources availab le to
them and seek to maximize utility across the life span by maximi zing the value of li fe
resources available for consumption subject to their constraints and preferences. For
purposes of this study, total resources at a given point in time proxied life resources
avai lable at that time. Based on the life cycle income hypothesis and the theoretical
models derived in Chapter 3, households may benefit from carrying mortgaged debt
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assu ming the presence of other characteristics. However, w ithout the other
characteristics and assuming equal interest rates on debt and savings, negl igibl e
differences in changes in wealth between househo ld s carrying mortgage debt and
those without mortgage debt should be observed.
Based on the tradeoff theory (Myers, 200 I), households may optimize the
present value of thei r total resources by ut ilizing tax-advantaged debt to the extent that
the amount did not create financial distress. Given thi s theoretical premise, a positive
assoc iati on between mortgage debt and changes in wea lth should be observable.
Continuing w ith the tradeoff theory, a co ncave relation between the sq uare of initi al
mortgage deb t and changes in weal th should also be observable as households take on
excessive mortgage debt and experience fin ancial di stress.
A major limitat ion of appl ying the tradeoff theory to households was that
household goals and business goals are very di fferent. To the extent that househo ld s
use mortgage debt to leverage themselves fo r in vestment purposes, the tradeoff th eory
was applicable. However, if households used mortgage debt to suppl ement
consumption, which, based on Greenspan's (2003) discussion many hou sehold s did,
tradeoff theory wo uld not be applicable. Mortgage debt would thu s genera lly be
negatively assoc iated with wea lth since the consumption comes with the additional
interest cost.
Given the sample restrictions used in th is study and based on the life cyc le
income hypothesis and the tradeoff theory in the presence of taxes, the fo llowi ng
hypo theses re lating to the hou sehold leverage ratio were proposed:

34
1.1

HA: Controll ing for other factors, the initia l household leverage ratio is
positively associated wit h changes in assets and total resources.

Based on the tradeoff theory, those hou sehold s that maintained or increased
financial leverage during the period of interest would be most likely to realize greater
benefi ts of being leveraged. Thu s, the foll owing hypotheses were proposed:
2. 1

HA: Controlling for other factors , paying off mortgage debt , as
compared to constantly unleveraged households, is negatively
assoc iated wi th changes in assets and total resources.

2.2

HA: Controlling for other factors, keeping or incurring mortgage debt,
as compared to constantly unleveraged househo lds, is positively
assoc iated with chan ges in assets and total resources.

The tradeoff th eory, as discussed by Myers (200 1), hypothesized that a
busi ness will take on debt so long as the benefits exceed the costs ofpotentia1
financial distress . Similarly, househo lds take on debt in order to increase consumption
and shift resources between time periods. Generally, but not always, hou seholds will
take on debt to the point that th e benefits of the debt exceed the psychological and
financial burdens associated with it. Supporting thi s idea were Crook's (2001)
fi ndings that the amount of debt demanded by households has a curvilinear
relation ship with income and beyond a certain income, th e demand for debt decreases.
et worth is also negati vely related to the amount of debt demanded (Crook) . Based
on thi s premise, a curvilinear relation between financial leverage and wealth was
hypothesized in th e fo llowing manner:
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3.1

HA: Controlling for other factors, the square of the initial leverage ratio
multiplied by I ,000 is negatively assoc iated with changes in assets and
total resources.

In come and Work

The U.S. utilizes a progressive income tax structure so that higher income
households pay taxes at higher rat es. As a result of this tax structure, higher marginal
tax bracket households realize greater tax savings from interest deducti ons (Stango,

1999). Consequen tly, households in high er marginal tax brackets have the potential of
garnering the greatest benefits from leveraging themselves through mortgage debt.
M aki (I 995 ) found evidence that only high-income, sophisticated househo ld s showed
evidence of shuffling their debt holdings in response to tax Jaw changes. Households
with greater income also tend to save more of their income, thus increasing their
wea lth more than households with low incomes (Ke1mickell & Starr-McCluer, 1997).
Participation in the labor mark et by households enables them to convert human
capi tal into financial capital. Household s with longer periods of participation, all
other things equal, should have greater ability to convert human capital to fin ancial
capital. The following hypotheses are proposed regarding household income and
trends in labor market participation:

4.1

HA: Controlling for other factors, household income is positi vely
related with changes in assets and total resources.
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5. 1a

HA: Controlling for other factors , working in 1992 and not working in

2002, as compared to working in 1992 and 2002, is positively related
with changes in assets.
5. 1b

HA: Con tro lling for oth er factors , working in 1992 and not working in

2002, as compared to work ing in 1992 and 2002, is ne~atively related
with changes in assets ..
5.2a

HA: Controll ing for other factors , not worki ng in 1992 and working in

200, as compared to households working in 1992 and 2002, is
negat ively related with changes in assets.
5.2b

HA: Controlling for other factors , not workin g in 1992 and working in

200, as compared to househo lds working in 1992 and 2002, is
positively related with changes in assets.
5.3a

HA: Controlling for oth er facto rs, not working in 1992 and not working

in 2002, as compared to households working in 1992 and 2002, is
negati vely related with changes in assets.
5.3b

HA: Controlli ng for other factors, not working in 1992 and not working

in 2002, as co mpared to household s working in 1992 and 2002, is
positively related with changes in assets.

Initial Wealth and Portfolio Allocation

Changes in total resou rces, in part icu lar financial wealth, had a strong relation
with th e household 's in itial wealth standing and risk tolerance, or exposure to risky
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assets (Gutter, 2000; Kennick ell & Starr-McCluer, 1997). As Kennickell and StarrMcCJuer found, higher initi al wea lth was positively associated wi th greater increases
in wealth. If the percent change in wealth were measured, then lower leve ls of initial
wea lth wou ld lik ely be associated w ith the greatest changes in wealth . Similar to the
methodology used by Kenni ckell and Starr-McCJuer, initial wealth percentiles were
used to control for init ial wealth holdings. The household's initial total resources
were included. Human capital was not explicit ly included because it was already
proxied by income, health status, and education . Ri sk tolerance was proxi ed by the
household's allocation of its non-housing assets to ri sky assets (Friend & Blume,
I 975; Gutter). Brinson, Singer, and Beebower (I 99 1) found that th e allocati on of
portfoli o assets- between stocks, bonds, and cash- was far more important th an timing
and specific asset selection . Based on the empirical research the followin g
hypotheses were proposed:
6. I

HA: Controlling for oth er fa cto rs, the househo ld ' s initi al level of total
reso urces, compared to the 0 to 25'h percentile category, is positively
related w ith changes in assets and total resources.

7. I

HA: Controllin g for other factors, the initial ratio of ri sky assets to total
non-housing assets is pos iti ve ly rel ated wi th changes in assets and total
reso urces.

Maki (1996) noted that the policy goals of the 1986 TRA were frustrated in
large measure because households substituted mortgage debt for consumer debt.
Usi ng mortgage proceeds to fi nance current consumptio n was an important
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considerati on in this research. ln order to proxy the household's preference to borrow
for current cons umption, the amount of other debt held (credit card debt, medical debt,
and other personal loans) by the household was included and its relation to changes in
wealth were hypothesized as follows :
8.1

HA: Controlling for other factors, th e amount of other debt is negat ively
related to changes in assets and total resources .

Inheritance

Many households have bequest motives and thi s remains an important facto r
in wealth accum ul ation and decumulation behaviors (Modigliani, 1986). Modigliani
estimated that 20 to 25% of househo ld wealth was a result of inheritances. Because of
the impact bequests can have on changes in household wealth, receiving an
inh eritance and the likelihood of leaving a bequest were included in. the model. The
fo ll owing hypotheses regarding initial wealth ho ldings and bequests were proposed :
9.1

HA: Contro lling for other factors , receiving an inheritance, as compared
to those households that did not receive an inheritance during the
period of observation, is positi ve ly related to changes in assets and total
resources.

I 0. 1

HA: Controlling for other fac tors, expecting to leave a sizable estate,
compared to not expecting to leave a sizab le estate, is positively related
to changes in assets and total resources.
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Heailh and Demographics

Weal th was also affected by the hea lth status of th e indivi dual. Declines in
hea lth statu s shortened ex pected working years as we ll as reduced the amount of work
performed during wo rking years, reduc ing th e indi vidual ' s human wealth, and thereby
red ucing thei r total resources (Grossman, 1973). The following hypotheses were
proposed regarding health:
11.1

HA: Controlling for other factors, ini tial self-rated health is positively
related to changes in assets and tota l resources .

12 . 1

HA: Contro llin g for other fac tors, dec lines in self-rated health, as
compared to those who maintained th eir health , is negatively related to
c hanges in assets and total reso urces.

12.2

HA: Controlling for oth er factors, improved self-rated health, as
compared to those who maintained their health, is positively related to
changes in assets and tot al resources.

Household size was also included in th e mod el to estimate the costs and
resources avai labl e to the household. Genera ll y, increases in the number of ad ults in
the ho usehold increased its eam ing capacity and thus available resources. On the
other hand , increases in th e number of chi ldren strained the household's resources and
may have depleted assets (Bryant, 1990). Ho usehold size and changes in household
size were included in the model w ith the follow ing associated hypotheses:
13. 1

HA: Co nt roll ing for oth er factors, initial hou sehold size is negatively
related to changes in assets and total reso urces.
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14.1

HA: Controll ing for other factors, increases in the household size, as

compared to households that remain the same size, is negative ly related
to changes in assets and total reso urces.
14.2

HA: Controllin g for other factors , decreases in th e household size, as

compared to households that remain the same size, is positively related
to changes in assets and total resources.
Wealth accumu lation patterns were a function of age, genera ll y increasi ng to a
peak and then decreasi ng as the individual consumed accumulated wealth
(Modigliani, 1986). Because of this, age was a key variable when modeling changes
in wea lth. The square of age was not included in thi s study beca use of the li mited
span of ages included in the sampl e. Based on the life cycle income hypothesis, the
foll ow ing hypoth esis was proposed:
15.1 a HA: Controlling for other factors, age of the individual or oldest partner
is positively related to changes in assets.
15.1 b HA: Controlling for other factors, age of the individual or oldest partner
is negativel y related to changes in total resources .
The househo ld 's educati on level is also import ant. Maki (1996) found that
more educated households with higher incomes were the only hou sehold s that
reshuffled their debt holdings to tak e advantage of potential benefits in the tax code.
The combinations of mortgage debt and education and mortgage debt and incom e
appear to be good ind icators of the household's ability to capitalize on tax code
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benefits. As a result ofMaki's findings , the following was hypothesized regarding
education and educated hou seholds' ability to successfu lly leverage themselves:
16.1

HA: Controlling for other factors , the highest year of schoo ling
completed is positively related to changes in assets and total resources.

Based on Maki 's (1995 , 1996) findings , the interaction between mortgage debt
and income and education was expected to be positive. Based on the id ea of
borrowing low-cost mortgage debt to invest in more profitable securities also implies
that the interaction between th e household ' s allocation of assets to risky investments
and mongage debt was positive (Stonns, 1996; Tomlinson, 2002). Observed
household bon·owing behavior is consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis,
therefore, the comb ination of mortgage debt and age was also included in the model.
The following hypotheses were proposed to model the int eraction between mortgage
debt, as measured by the household leverage ratio, and its interaction with several
variables.
17.1

HA: Controlling for other factors , the combination of the highest year
of schooling comp leted and the initial leverage ratio is positively
related to changes in assets and total resources.

18.1

HA: Controlling for other fac tors, the comb ination of household income
in 1991 and the initial leverage ratio is positively related to changes in
assets and total resources.
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19. 1

HA : Controll ing for other fac tors, the combination of the ratio of risky
investments to non-housing assets and the initial leverage ratio is
positively related to changes in assets and total reso urces.

20.1

HA: Contro ll ing for other fac tors, the comb inati on of the age of the
oldest household respondent and the in itial leverage ratio, is posi tively
related to changes in assets and total resources.

Demographi c characteristics of househo lds were infl uenti al detenninants of
ho useholds' ri sk tolerance, the propensi ty to borrow, and wealth ho ldings. Key
demographi c variab les, such as marital status and race, were selected and the
fol lowi ng hypothesized relations were proposed:
2 1.1

HA : Co ntrolling fo r other factors, initi ally single female ho useholds, as
compared to married households, is negatively related to changes in
assets and total resources.

22.2

HA: Contro lling for other fac tors, ini tially si ngle male ho useho lds, as
compared to married househo ld s, is negati vely related to changes in
assets and total resources.

23.1

HA: Contro lling fo r other factors, the househo ld head being African
American, as compared to non-Hi spani c White hou sehold heads, is
negati vely related to changes in assets and total resources.

24.2

HA: Controlli ng for other factors, the household head being H ispan ic,
as compared to non-Hispan ic W hi te ho usehold heads, is negati vely
re lated to changes assets and total resources.
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25.3

HA: Controlling for other factors, the household head being other, as
compared to non-Hispanic Whi te household heads, is negatively related
to changes in assets and total resources.

Table 2.1 is a summary of the hypothesized relations, while controlling for
other variables.

Table 2.1
Summary of Hypolheses for Changes in Asse1s and To1al Resources

Hypothesi zed effects
Variable

Assets

Total resources

Household leverage
1992 debt ratio (x I 000)

+

+

+

+

+

+

Change in ratio'
Paid off
Kept or borrowed
1992 debt ratio squared
Income and work
1991 income (in OOOs)
Work status (working to working')
Working to not working

+

Not working to working

+

Not working to not working

+

Ini tial wealth and portfolio
1992 total resources (0 - 25'h ')
25'h- 49''

+

+

50'h- 74'h

+

+
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Hypothesized effects
Variable

Assets

Total resources

75'h - 89'h

+

+

90'h- I OO'h

+

+

+

+

+

+

Risky assets to total assets
1992 other debts (in OOOs)
Inh eritance
Received inheri tance
Leave estate (not likely')
Defi nitely

+

+

Probably

+

+

Possibl y

+

+

Exce ll ent

+

+

Very good

+

+

Good

+

+

No change

+

+

Improved

+

+

+

+

H ealth
1992 health (fa ir or poor')

Change in hea lth (declined')

D emographics
1992 househo ld size
Change in househo ld size (constant')
Increased
Decreased
Age

+
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Hypothesized effects
Variable

Assets

Total resources

+

+

Debt ratio X education

+

+

Debt ratio X income

+

+

Debt ratio X risk

+

+

Educati on
lJ1teractions

Debt ratio X age
Coupled status (married')
Single female
Single male
Race (Non-Hi spanic White')
African American
Hispanic
Other
' Reference category.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Theoretical Model

The theoretica l rramework for this research was based on the life cycle income
hypothesis fonn alized by Ando and Modigliani (1963) wi th insights gained frorn
Modigli ani and Miller's (1958) work on corporate capital structure and the val ue of
corporations. Ando and Modigliani 's mathematical model was adapted to describe
consumpt ion over the life cycle and changes in total resources:

C, = O ,V,

[3.1]

where C, represents the total consumption of goods and services in period t. Q,
capt ures the characteristi cs of the individual, such as age, preference, and the rate of
retum o n investm ents, and is depend ent upon the indi vi dual's utility function . V,
denotes the present va lue of resources ava ilable to the individual. V, can be expanded
in a sim il ar manner to what is shown by Ando and Modi gliani:

N

V=A
+Y+
"'
I
1-1
I
~ (
I+

I

y
I

I + r,

) 11- 1

[3.2]
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where A,_1 captures the valu e of assets rema ining from the prior period avai lable for
consumpti on in period 1. Y, is th e non-investment income in then'' peri od 1, and

I (1 + rJ"-', summed from n

=

I: (YJ

1 + 1 to N, captures the present value of future non-

investment income in then'' peri od w ith an ea rn ings span of N years. The discount
rate, r, used by Ando and Modi gliani to calculate the present value of future labor
earn ings is the real rate of return on assets.
H anna et al. ( 1995) conduct ed their simul ations under th e assumption that the
interest rate on debt equa led the rate of return on assets. Foll owing this assumption,
and allowing the househo ld to borrow and invest the proceeds of the loan, 1, the
resources rema ining from the prior period are shown in equation 1.3.

N

}'

v, =[(A,_, +1,_,)-I,_, ] +Y, +I --'-,-_,

[3 .3]

,.,(l + r,)

lft he proceeds from th e loan are saved , then the addi ti on of the debt makes no
difference in the total reso urces avail ab le for consumption, V,. Continuing with Hanna
and colleagues' (1995) simplifyi ng assu mption that the rate of return on investments
equal s th e int erest rate on debt, the present value of the payments on the debt ,
assuming they last for n years, equals the value o f the debt as follows:

lt-1

[3.4]
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Equation 1.4 represents I as an o ffsetting cash flow against future nonin vestm ent income and therefore, future non-in vestment income can be shown as net
future non-investment income and the offsetting I will be removed from the prior
period assets as shown in eq uation 1.5:

N

v, =(A, _,+ I,_,)+ Y, + [ L

t+t

y

p, ,_, ]
(I + r,, )"_, L
,. ,(l + r, )
N

(3 .5]

OR

(3.6]

Again, the total resources availabl e for consumption are unchanged. If the
assumption of equal interest rates on debt and assets is relaxed, and the hou sehold has
a hi gher average rate of return across all assets th an the cost of debt, then the
hou sehold will be able to increase the total resources available for consumption by
borrowing and investing the proceeds. The increase in the total resources available for
consumption can be calculated as th e difference between the proceeds of the loan less
the present value of the payment based on the interest rate of the loan, d, and
discounted at the rate of return on th e assets, s. The value of the debt, when invested,
is equal to the proceeds of the loan because they wi ll be generating a rate of return
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equal to the d iscount rate used to estimate their present value. The payments on the
loan, K, are shown in equation 1.7.

K,

ld,(l+d,)"

(l +d,)"- 1

[3.7]

Substituting K for Pin equation 1.5 w ith the assumption that d < s, and
isolati ng thei r effects, th e change in V, is shown in equation 1.8.

[3.8]

The individual wi ll continue to borrow to in vest until the marginal costs of
borrowing equal the marginal benefits gained from borrowing. As an individual
becomes more indebted, the cost of debt rises because of the ri sks of bankruptcy. The
indi vidual may also invest more conservatively, dri ving down the rate of return on
assets, in order to increase th eir cert ainty that fi xed debt payments can be made
without ca using financi al distress. Th is specu lation is supported by Fratantoni 's
(2001) fi nding that heavily indebted individuals, such as home owners w ith a
mortgage, exhib it lower risk tolerance w ith their investments.
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Two important ass umptions were made regarding the conclusion, first the
individual ' s risk to lerance is such that they currently earn an average rate of return on
the ir assets in excess of the debt's cost. Second, that the indi vidual's inter\emporal
utility function is opt imized by such borrowi ng and sav ing behavior. These two
ass umpti ons are represented by Q, in equation 1.1.
The effect of taxes is simil ar to the effect of differences in the interest rates on
savings and debt. For illustra ti on of thi s effect , the ass umption that the interest rate on
debts is equal to the rate of return on assets is appli ed. Based on this assumption,
equation 1.5 is relevant.

vI-- (A

1- 1

+1 1-1 ) +YI +

l

I( l +ry )n-1 I( l+rp )n-1
N

N

I

[ 1+ 1

-

1

I

1+1

(3.5)

1

If taxes are introduced into the model, and assuming they are constant across
periods, then equation 1.5 can be rewritten as :

V = (A

I

+1
1- l

1- J

)*(1 -g )+Y*(1-g) + [fY, *(1 -g,)_ fP,*(l- g,)] [3.9)
0
I
L.... (
) 11- 1
L....J (
)Il-l
1+1
1 +r
t+l
1+r,
I

1

where g. is the m argi nal tax rate on income from assets faced by the indi vid ual and g,
is the marginal tax rate on non-investment income. Two different tax rates are
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included in the model in order to demonstrate that interest can be deducted at the
marginal non-investment incom e tax rate, while investment income generated from
assets, in particular dividends and capital gains, is taxed at lower marginal rates.
Since the principal from the debt is th e only argument in equation 1.9 that is
affected by the different tax rates on non-investment and investment in_come, on ly
those arguments will determine the change in resources, LIV,. Arguments in equation
1.9 not containing I or P wi ll be treated as constants. Equation 1.10 shows the change
in total resources, Ll V,, resulting from the unequa l marginal tax rates at which the cost
of debt is deducted and the earnings on the invested debt are taxed. The last argument
in equat ion 1.9 equals the sum of future debt payments discounted by the interest rate
on debt. Since, in thi s example, the interest rate on debt is eq ual to the interest rate on
savings, and treating (1 - g,) as a constant, the sum of future payments can be written
as (1 - g,) * 1,_1, as shown in equation 1.1 0, where g, < g,.

av, =(I,_, •(1- g,))- ((I- g, )'!,_,) =!,_, '(g,- g,)

(3. 10)

Equation 1.10 shows that when the int erest rates on assets and debt are the
same, some combination of debt and individ ual savings will maximize current
reso urces. This conc lusion is sim il ar to the conclus ion of the tradeoff theory and
represents the upper bound of potential economic benefits that could be gained from
leverage. The last equation in 1.10 is rewritten below to incorporate the leverage ratio
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into the eq uation, which is equal to the ratio of debt to total assets multiplied by total
assets .

l1V,
(

! ,_1
*(A I I + 1/ - I )"(
. gi - ga )
A, _1 + 1,_1 )

[3.1 1]

Thus, eq uati ons 1.8 and 1.11 are mathematical depiction s of how household
leverage can posit ively affect changes in total resources available. The purpose of this
study was not to detem1ine whether equation 1.8 or 1.11 dominates, but rather to
determine whether there is any empiri ca l suppo11 of a posi ti ve relation between debt
and wealth.
As mentioned previously, a comparison of historical rates of return expected
from the various savings options was appro pri ate, assuming that the individual
remains committed to his or her dec ided course of action . However, as research has
shown (Dalbar, 2001), the average investor experiences a rate of return significantly
below the market rate of return and therefore the indi vidual 's actual ex perience should
be used.

Model Specification and Design

Based on the review of literature and theoretical frameworks for the study, a
conceptual d iagram can be drawn dep icting the relati on between household leverage
and changes in total resources, while controlling for various factors . This was a
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correlational study employing a balanced panel longitudinal design using the I 992,
I 9\14, I 996, I \198, 2000, and 2002 waves oft he Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
TJu·ee factors were used to proxy the change in total resources, LIV, in equation I .1:
househo ld leverage, income and work status, and initial wealth. The household 's
preferences, which must also be accounted for in order to measure the _a ffects of
leverage on changes in wealth, were represented by .Q in equation I . I. Three
addi tional factors were included in the conceptual model representing Q, these factors
were health , bequests and inheritance, and demographics. The followin g diagram
depicts the conceptual model.

\

Leverage
~-

~

------------Health
)
~

~

Bequests
-----------------------

Income and work
~

------------------------ ~

Initial wealth
-,/'

--:::..---:__r

,

~

Change in total
resources

Figure 3.1. lllustration of the conceptual mod el.

-~
~
' Demographics

~---------------

1

54
Based on the conceptual model developed in the proceeding section, an
individual's utility can be expressed as a function of their consumption, subject to
their preferences.

U = u(C; Q)

[3 . 12)

Consumption in tum is a fun ction of the individual's resources, also subject to
their preferences.

C = c(V; Q)

[3.13)

Furthermore, a household 's total resources can be estimated in th e following
manner:

V = v(L, I, W ; Q)

[3.14)

where L, I, W, and .Orepresent vectors of variables . Lis the degree of household
leverage, I is th e cunent income and work status, and Wis the household 's initial
wealth. Based on the conceptual model diagramed in Figure 3.1, .Qis represented by
vectors of variab les for health status, bequests and inheritance, and demographic
characteristi cs. The change in total resources is likewise a function of these same
variables and is denoted as:
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D.V = v(L, I, W; H, B, D)

[3. 15]

where H represents th e household 's health status, B bequ est motives and inheritance,
and D the household 's demographi c characteri stics.

Data A.nalysis

Compa rative Statistics

Ch i-squ are and r-test statisti cs were used to address the first objective of this
st udy, namely to compare and contrast the charac teristics (i. e., total resources, income
and savi ngs, portfolio allocation, hea lth , and demographics) of leveraged households
(household s with mortgage debt) with unleveraged households (househo lds without
mortgage debt) in 1992 and 2002.
Trends in assets and tota l resources were charted based on the year of
observation. Trends in the leverage ratio and mortgage debt were charted by the year
of observation and by the age of the household, respectively.

Empirical Model

Robu st multivariat e regression was used to address the second objective,
namely to examine the rela ti on between household leverage and the change in the
household's total resources during the period from 1992 to 2002 while controlling for
other factors such as non-investment income, in iti al wealth, portfolio allocation,
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health stat us, and demographics . To account for possible sample selection bias
introduced by non-random attrition of the sample fro m 1992 to 2002, Heckman 's
( 1979) two-stage procedure was also used.
Th e full balanced panel design elimin ates all hou seholds that were not
surveyed in each of the six survey waves. Zi li ak and Kni esner ( 1998) have argued
that sample attriti on over time may not be random. If the attrition is non-random, then
the estimated regression parameters are biased. The bi as resu lts in non-zero
covariance in the error term of the estimated regression model, which in tum biases
the esti mated parameters. This is a result of the model predicti ng not only the effects
of the individual variabl es o n the change in total reso urces, but also attempting.to
pred ict that th e household d id not drop o ut of the sampl e.
Zi li ak and Kniesner (1998) recommended using Heckman's (1979) procedure
to control for non-random samp le attrition resulting in sample selection bias. First the
probabi lity of dropping out was estimated for the sub sample of home owners in 1992,
using probit or logit procedures. Second, the in verse Mill 's ratio, or A (lambda), was
estimated. Third, A was includ ed in the est imat ed mode l as an exogenous variab le.
By including A in the regress ion model, sampl e se lection bias was controlled for and
the resulting regress ion parameters were consistent.
Fo llowing the procedure outli ned by Heckm an (1979), equation 1.16
represents the probability that a household surveyed in 1992 was also surveyed in
2002.
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P, = E(Y= ![X, )=

1
l+ e-(a+P,x.)

[3.16)

where Y =I if the i 1" household was surveyed in 2002, X, is a vector of exogenous
variables, a is a constant, and/), is a vector of parameters associated with the
exogenous variables. Equation 1.16 is nonlinear with respect to fJ, and X,. As
illustrated by Gujarati (2002) Equation 1. 16 can be transformed in the following
manner:

p
a+P·X
--'-=e

[3.17)

II

1-

P,

Where the ratio of ? 1 over I - P1 is simp ly the odds ratio of the i 1" household being
surveyed in both 1992 and 2002. The model can be made linear with respect to/}, by
taking the natura l log of both sides, as shown in Equation 1.18.

L =
I

ln(_!l_)
1-P,

=a+

ax.

/Jj

[3 .18]

I

The natural log of the odds ratio, or L, also called the logit, in Equation 1.18
represents the logit model (Gujarati , 2002). The logit model is linear with respect to
/)
1

and can be estimated by using maximum likelihood procedures. Once the Jogit was
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estimated for each household surveyed in I 992, the probability of that househo ld also
being surveyed in 2002 could be estimated using Equation I .16.
The estimated probability found in Equation I. I 6 was then used in the inverse
of the standard nonnal cumulative distribution function to obtain the equivalent output
of a probit procedure (Lee, I 983; Smits, 2003). The resul ts oft he transfonnation, Z,,
were then included in the est im ation of A, for each househo ld. A, was estimated in the
following manner, as illustrated by Heckman (I 979):

(3.19)

where rp is the probability density function of a standard nom1al variab le and 1/J is the
cumulative distribution function of a standard nonnal variab le. The resulting A1 could
then be included as a regressor in the ordinary least squares regression model to
con trol for possible bias arising from non-random sampling.
Heckman's (I 979) two-stage estimation procedure has been suggested to
correct for samp le selecti on bias (Kim, 2002; Z ili ak & K.niesner, I 998). Kim used
age, marital status, race, education, income, home ownership, mobility status, and
region as detem1inants of samp le attrition. Similar determinants were used in this
study to obtain the inverse Mills ratio, or lambda, from the Heckman procedure.
Robust multivariate regression was an appropriate method of analysis for the
data and object ives becau se of the heavy-tailed and continuous distribution of the
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dependent variab les. This approach was similar to Kennickell and Starr-McCluer
( 19'J7) analysis of changes in wealth using the Survey of Consumer Finances 1983 to
1989 panel data.
Robust multivariate regress ion uses an iterative process to weight the
individual cases. ln OLS regression, each case receives a weight equal to 1. Outlier
cases can exert substantial influence on estimated model coefficients and errors. This
problem is particularly acute for heavy-tailed data where a significant number of cases
could be deemed "outliers." Robust regression analysis provides a method whereby
outli er cases are identified and systematicall y down weighted so they can be included
in the analysis without resulting in severe estimation errors (Hamilton, 1992).
Hamilton (1992) suggests a robust weighting procedure where cases are first
weighted using Huber estimation followed by Tukey's biweight estimation procedure.
Huber estimation begins with the estimation of an OLS model for the data. Residuals
are scaled using some scale estimate. A tuning constant is specified and cases with
residual s greater than the tuning constant are assigned weights less than one. A
second weighted least squares model is esti mated incorporating the weights derived
from the results of the precedin g estimated mod el. Again, cases with residuals greater
than some constant are assigned a weight less than one and the process is again
repeated . The process is repeated until the maximum change in case weights is less
than 0.05.
Once the maximum change in weights falls below 0.05, Tukey's biweight
procedure is applied to the model. The procedure is sim ilar to Huber estimation;
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however, a different weight function is used. Tukey's biweight procedure (Mosteller

& Tuk ey, 1977, as ci ted in Hamilton, 1992) assigns weights to all cases in the sampl e.
Any ex treme residuals remaining after the init ial iterative weighting procedure using
Huber est imation are assigned a weight equal to zero. A weighted least squares model
is estimated using Tukey' s biweights and the biweight function is applied to the
resu lting case residuals. The process is repeated until maximum changes in the
estimated weights are less th an 0.01. Because the we ights used in the estimated model
are a random variab le, the standard errors must be adj usted to reflect the bias
introduced in the weighting procedure. The following section provides greater detail
on the procedure used in thi s study.
A common sca le factor for the res idual s of the estim ated OLS model is the
standard deviat ion of the res idu als; however, th e residual 's standard deviation can be
significant ly influenced by outliers. An altemative scale to the standard deviation of
the error (e,) was used in thi s study. The altemat ive scale was the median absolute
deviation of the error, or MAD:

MAD = median le 1 - median(e)l

[3.20]

MAD was standardized by dividing it by the constant 0.6745. The constant is the
midpoint of the absolute value of a standard normal variabl e (Fox, 2002). Dividing
MAD by the midpoint of the standard normal variable gives a scale estimate that was
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resistant to the effects of outliers, because it is based on the median, rather the mean of
the residual ' s distribution (Hamilton, 1992). The resulting scale estimate was:

MAD
0.6745

[3.21]

s=---

resid uals were then scaled in the following manner:

[3.22]

s

Using Huber estimat ion, th e following we ight function was applied to the
scaled residuals from the estimated OLS model:

c

if lu,l 5 c

[3.23a]

if lu'l > c

[3.23b]

The tuning constant, c, for this study was I .345 which resulted in an estimation
procedure 95% as efficient as OLS estimation (Hamilton, 1992). The esti mated
weights were then used in a weighted least squares procedure using SPSS 12.0 for
Windows. The same weight function and tuning constant were reappli ed to the data
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and new weights were estimated. Six iterations of the procedure were perfom1ed
before the maximum change in the weights was 0.02.
For the two estimated models in this study for change in assets and change in
total resources, the 7'h and 6'h iterations of the procedure applied Tukey's biweight
estimate function to the residuals from the 6'h and 5'h iterations, respectively. The
biweight function app li ed to the residuals was:

if Ju,J ~ c

if Ju,J>c

[3 .24a]

[3.24b]

A new tuning constant equal to 4.685 was used with the biweight function. The
tuning constant used resulted in 95% efficiency relative toOLS models (Hamilton,
1992). The procedure was repeated using weighted least square regression . After the
15'h and II <h iterations for the two models the maximum change in the estimated
weights was 0.0045 and 0.0086, respect ively. The estimated coefficients' standard
errors were corrected using a procedure outlined by Street, Carroll, and Rupert (as
cited in Hamilton).
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Continu ing from the conceptual model, the following empirical model was
used to detem1ine the effects of leverage on changes in asset and total resources while
controll ing for other characteristi cs:

I

I

I

G 2t::.TR, = G 2 {,80, + ,81,L, + ,82,1, + ,B, w; + ,LJ.,B, + ,85,H, + ,86 ,D, + fJ7,A.,} + G 2c,

[3.25a]

I

I

I

G2t::.As1; = G' {,B0 , +,81,L, +,821 1, +,B,, w; +,B,,B, +,B,, H, +,86,D, +,B,,..i,)+G 2c,

[3.25 b]

where L, 1,
and

W. B, H, and D were vectors of independent variables and ,81, ,81 , ,81, ,8,, ,85 ,

,86 were vectors of parameters assoc iated with the independent vari ables. G111 was

a vector of weight variables deri ved from robust regression procedure, L was a vector
of the vari ables related to th e househo ld 's leverage ratio, 1 was a vector of variab les
related to the household's income and sav ings behavior, Wwas a vector of variables
related to initial wealth. These three vectors were the principal components of total
resources and proxy V, in Equation 1.1. B, H, and D represented vectors of variables
related to bequests, health stat us, and demographics, respectively, and proxy D. in
Eq uation 1.14. The model also included -l, which controlled for sample selection
bias. The error term, c,, is nom1al ly distributed w ith a mean of zero .
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Two models were estimated. The first model estimated th e change in
househo ld assets from 1992 to 2002 . The dependent variable for th e second model
was the change in the household's to tal resources fro m 1992 to 2002. Because the
data was longitudin al, the stationarity of the dependent vari ables was examined to
detem1in e whether a more appropriate estim ati on method wo uld be an autoregressive
in tegrated movi ng average (ARIMA) model. Th e data was tested for non stati onarity
and no evidence of that problem was fou nd . The models were also tested for
autocorrelati on, heteroskedac ity, and multi co linearity. Autocorrelati on was tested
using the Durbin- Watson stati stic and the presence ofmulti colinearity was checked
using the conditi on ind ex and variance infl ati on factors. Heteroskedac ity in the
estim ated ch anges in wea lth was checked by ex ami ning th e estim ated squared
residuals again st changes in assets (Gujarati , 2002).

Data and Measurement

Data

The Hea lth and Retirement Stud y is an ongo ing national longitudinal survey
conduc ted every two years by the Survey Research Center at the Univers ity of
Mi chi gan. This study used data gathered in th e 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and
2002 waves of the Health and Reti rement Study {I nstitute for Social Research , 1995 ,
1998, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). The study is fu nded largely by the

ational

Insti tut e on Aging (J ust er & Suzman, 199 5). The ori ginal HRS sampl e consisted of
ind iv id uals and thei r partners, if appli cabl e, who were between the ages of 51 and 6 1
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at the time of the first wave in 1992. The intent of the HRS is to provide researchers
from a variety of different fields with insight into the transition from the labor force
into retirement.
The sample size for the initial wave of the HRS consisted of 12,654
individuals. Approximately 8 1% of the initial sample was married, and women
represented 53.6% of the origina l sample. Where possible, both spouses were .
interviewed and includ ed in the sample, even if on ly the selected spou se met the age
crit eria. The sample design over-sampled African Americans and Hi spanics in order
to allow researchers the ability to in vestigate these groups individually. The samp le
design also over-sampled individuals in Florida. As a result of over-samp ling of so me
gro ups and geographic areas, and th e inclu sion of age ineli gib le spo uses in the samp le,
the data set includes individual and househo ld weights, which when applied to the
individual or household cases make th e data a nati onally representative sampl e.
The HRS is an idea l sample to address the objecti ves of this study because of
it s represent ati ve nature and age of respondents. The respondents in th e HRS are
lik ely in their peak savings and investing years as they prepare for retirement or enter
retirement. The idea of util izing househo ld leverage to increase wealth wo uld be most
app li cab le to thi s population because of their stage in the life cycle.
Thi s study limited the sample to stable households- households that did not
experience a change in marital status during the period of observation, were
interviewed in each wave of the study, and reported owning their home in 1992.
Household leverage, income and savings, health status and some demographic
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variables were calculated over the 1992 to 2002 time period. All dollar calculations
were adjusted to reflect constant 2002 dollars.
The HRS includes imputed values for missing financial information. Missing
values for some other variables associated with pensions are also imputed. ln order to
preserve the sample size for this study, impu ted values for missing infonnation were
used in this study.

Measurement

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this st udy were the first differences between: total
resources in 2002 and total resources in 1992, and household assets in 2002 and
household assets in 1992 . This approach was simi lar to Kennickell and StarrMcCluer's (1997) approach when they examined changes in wealth using panel data
from the 1983 to 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances. The first model estimated the
change in assets between 1992 and 2002, while the second model estimated the
change in total resources during the period.
Total resources and hou seho ld assets were estimated for each observation
period in the following manner. First, all variables denoted by dollars were adjusted
to 2002 dollars . This adjustment was based on the historical inflation information in
Ibbotson Associates (2002). Second, all reported net worth was summed for each
household. Reported net worth included: bank accounts, CDs, stocks, bonds, mutual
funds, lRAs, Keoghs, cash val ue life insurance, annuities, defined contribution
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retirement plans, coll ectibles, vehic le equity, home equity, other rea l estate, and
bus in ess ho ldi ngs. Assets reported in the HRS were reported at their net value, or
what the ho usehold would have had if they had so ld the asset and paid off all debts
assoc iated wi th the asset. Thi s const itutes househo ld assets for each period of
observat ion . Add itional steps were necessary to calculate the total resources for the
household .
The next step in calcul ating the househo ld 's total resources required the
estimati on of the present value of future cash flows such as defined benefi t pensions,
VA pension, an d Social Security benefi ts. 111 ord er to estimate the present va lue of
these assets, an appropriate discount rate was detem1ined . Because of the guaranteed
nat ure of Soc ial Security, and th e cost of li ving adjustments included with it, the
fu ture payments were discounted usi ng th e average real yield on long-te1m U.S .
Treasury Bonds for the period of January I, 1992 to December I, 2002. The real rate
of retum was calcu lated using data reported by Ibbotson Associates (2002). Defin ed
benefit pension plans that include a cost of li ving adjustment were a lso discounted
using the average real yield discussed above. The average real yield on the I 0-year
U.S . Treasury Bond was used because of th e long-tem1 nature of these payments. The
majority of households will receive these cash flow s for at least 10 years, but not more
th an 20 years based on life expectancies. The I 0-year U.S . Treasury Bond most
close ly approximated this time hori zon. The average nominal yie ld was used to
discount defi ned benefit pensions that did not have cost-of-living adjustment features.
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The age of the sample provided an advantage in determining the present value
of Social Security and defined benefit pensions beca use many individuals in the
sample began drawing on these assets during the observation period and the actual
benefits were observed rather than estimated. The antic ipated duration of such cash
flows as reported by the responden t was used in the present value calculati on . For
life-long cash flows, the life tabl es published by the U.S. Center for Disease Control
were used to detem1ine the life expectancy of Wh it e and Black males and females
(United States Center for Disease Contro l, 2003). The life tables did not include
estimates for Hispanic males and females; th erefore, Hispanics were assigned life
ex pectancies based on the life tab les for Wh ite males and females.
The present value of Social Security benefits in each wave was estimated by
taking the present value of the payments received by the household. For years when
benefits had not yet begun, the amount ofrepo r1ed benefits in later years was
di scounted back to that year. For households that had not begun to receive Social
Security benefits by 2002 , their expected Social Security benefits were used. The
ex pected Social Security benefit was based on the individual's respon se to the
following qu estions , "Do you expect to receive Social Security benefi ts at some tim e
in the future?" (Institute for Social Research , 2003b, variab le #HJ4 79), "At what age
do you ex pect to start collecting these benefits?" (Institute for Social Research, 2003b,
variable #HJ480), and "If you start collecting Social Security benefits then, about how
much do you expect the payments to be in today's dollars?"(lnstitute for Social
Research, 2003 b, variable #HJ481). The 1992 present value of Social Security
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payments was calculated as the di scounted present value of Social Securi ty benefits
found in subsequent waves.
A simi lar approach to that out lined above was used to detem1ine the present
va lue of any defined benefit pensions to which the household was entitl ed. First, the
present value of current defined benefit pension payments was calculated for those
ho useholds that began to receive benefits during the period of observation. The
present va lu e of such payments was estim ated based on whether the payments were
adjusted fo r cost-of-livi ng increases and whether the tenn of payments were designed
to be single-life, joint-life, or for a spec ific te1m. If th e respondent indi cated that the
payments were periodically adju sted for cost-of-living increases, the real rate ofretum
on th e 10-year U. S. Treasury note was used to ca lcul ate the present value . If the
paymen ts were not adj usted for increases in the cost of li ving, th e nomi nal rate of
return on the 10-year U. S. Treasury note was used in the calc ulations. Defined benefit
pension payments observed in the later years of the period of observation were
discoun ted back to previous years.
The present value of future benefits was estimated for those indi viduals in the
2002 wave that reported being covered by a defined benefit plan , but who had not yet
begun to receive payments. For these indiv iduals, th e expected payments and terms of
payment were calculated using infonnation provided by the respondent. In 2002, at
least one individual in 427 households reported being covered by an empl oyer
sponsored defined benefit pension program sponsored by their employer. Of these
cases, 2 I 8 Jacked sufficient data to esti mate the amount of the expected benefit
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payments or the present va lue o f such payments. If the individual responded that they
"Don't know" or "Refused" to state the amount of future benefits , then the interviewer
asked a series of questions to obtain some range w ithin which the expected amount
laid. Using the midpoint of these ranges, 6 additional presen t value calculat ions were
made reducing the number of missing cases to 212. These cases were dropped from
the samp le because the present value of expec ted defined benefit pensions could not
be estimated.
Ando and Modigliani (1963) discounted all future eamings by the real rate of
retu m eamed on assets by the household. The data did not provide sufficient detail to
calculate an accurate rate of return on all assets. Gutter (2000), when estimating the
va lu e of an indi vidual's human capital, discoun ted future eami ngs using the long-run
rate of return on large cap stocks reported by Jbbotso n Associates. A similar approach
was used in this study. All future eamings were discounted using the nominal rate on
large cap stocks, as reported by Jbbotson Associates (2002), for the period 1992
through 2002. This time period was unusual because it captured one of the longest
periods of economic expansion in U.S. history res ulting in a discount rate higher than
the long-run average. However, the higher discount rate on future earnings used in
thi s stu dy was waJTant ed because of the rapid pace at w hich the economy was
changing during thi s time period as a resu lt of new technology, innovation, and
general modernization. This change in the economy resulted in substantial job
turnover and job eli mination . Older workers may have been a vu ln erab le segment of
the labor fo rce during this tim e period, th us increasi ng the uncertainty of future
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earnings. The greater uncertainty regarding future earnings was captured with the
higher discount rate.
Actual constant dollar earnings from 1992 to 2002 were used to estimate the
present value of the individual 's, and household's, future earnings. The present va lue
of future eamings was calculated for individua ls still working in 2002 based on the
individua l's 2002 earnings from employment and the earlier of the respondent's
expected age at retirement, age when they expect to reduce their work hours, or life
expectancy.

independent Variables
Morrgage debt. The household's initial amount of mortgage debt in 1992 was
equa l to the total amount of any debt secured against the household's primary and
secondary residence, including outstanding home equi ty lines of credit and any
mortgages on second homes. This amount was adjusted to reOect 2002 dollars.

Leverage ratio. The househo ld 's initial leverage ratio was calculated by
dividing the household 's mortgage debt by total assets. All model estimations
included the leverage ratio calculated using total assets. A second leverage ratio was
also calcu lated using th e househo ld's total resources in the denominator for illu strative
purposes. For all ca lcul ations the value of the household's residencies was included at
full va lue rather than net value.
Changes in housing debt were also observed from 1992 to 2002. A
dichotomous variable (1, 0) was used to indicate whether a household paid off,
maintained or incurred, or remained without mortgage debt from 1992 to 2002.
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Households without mortgage debt in 1992 and 2002 were used as the reference
group.
Based on the tradeoff theory and findings among bankruptcy filers, too much
leverage cou ld resu lt in very negative consequences for households and could act to
diminish rather than increase total resources available. In order to proxy this effect,
the square of the initial leverage ratio multiplied by I ,000 was included in the model.

Total household income. Total household income included income from all
sources before taxes. Total household income was used to proxy the household's
margina l tax bracket. Because of the variety of tax rates on various types of income,
as well as the variety of deductions, credits, and exemptions offered in the IRS tax
code, no attempt to estimate the household's marginal tax rate was made. In addition
to th e comp lexities of the tax code, sign ificant changes were made to the tax code in
1992 which introduced new tax rates and brackets (Tax Policy Center, n.d.).

Work trend. The household's trend in work status from I 992 to 2002 was also
included in the models. The household was deemed to be working if the respondent
was employed, temporarily laid off, or looking for work. Individuals that reported
being disabled or retired were categorized as not working. For married households, if
either spouse was working, the household was categorized as working. Individuals
that reported being a homemaker were assigned the work status of their partner, if
partnered; if not partnered , homemakers were categorized as not working. Individuals
that refused to provide their working status, or reported an other status, were assigned
their partner's status if married. If not married, or neither partner reported their status,
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the status was assigned the status in 1992 or 2002, whichever wave had reported
inforn1ation. If neither wave contained the individual's or partner's status, the case
was dropped from the samp le. Fifteen cases were dropped.
In ilia/ lola/ resources. Ini tial total resources were calculated for all

househo lds in 1992. Households were then ranked and separated into percentile
categories similar to those used by Kennickel and Starr-McCJuer (I 997). A
di chotomous variable was then used to classifY each household into its respective
percentile category. The group with the least amount of total resources was used as
the reference group.
Risky asse/ allocQ/ion. The hou sehold 's al location of non-housing assets to

risky investments was calculated. Previous studi es, such as Friend and Blume ( 1975 ),
defined risky assets as those having uncertainty associated with their returns.
Included in this definit ion would be bonds, home eq uity, and human capital. This
study examined the effect of household leverage, through the use of mortgages, on
changes in wealth. One way for leveraging to be effecti ve was to invest the borrowed
funds in assets yielding rates of return greater than the rate of interest being charged
on the borrowed funds . For this study, risky assets were those assets that have
historically earned higher rates of return than the int erest rate on mortgage debt. Since
the interest rate on mot1gage debt is based on interest rates in the bond market plus a
spread, bonds were not considered risky assets for this study. Higher-yielding bonds
were available to investors, however, the HRS does not differentiate between highyield and other bonds. Furthem10re, the interest income from bonds (other than
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municipal bonds) does not receive favorable tax treatment and is taxed at the
household's marginal tax rate, thus offsetting the favorable tax treatment of the
mortgage debt.
Ownership, or equity assets, have hi storically eamed rates of retum higher
than that charged for mortgage debt. This asset category included stocks, bu siness
holdings, investment real estate, and equity mutual fund s. For IRAs and defined
co ntribution retirem ent accounts in which the individual could direct the investment
choices, respondents were asked how the money was invested and then given the
following choices: (I) mostly or all stocks; (2) mostly or all interest earning; (3)
evenly split; (4) other; (8) don't know; or (9) refused (111stitute for Social Research,
2003a, variab le #F4907, #F4928, #F3 472) . The HRS did not contain asset allocation
information for every IRA or defined contribution retirement plan the respondent
mentioned . The reported asset allocation of existing IRAs or defined contribution
plans was applied to those accounts for which asset allocation information was not
available.
To detem1ine the amount of ri sky assets in these accounts, two-thirds of the
account was counted as risky if the respondent said it was "mostly or all stocks," half
of th e account value was deemed risky if the respondent selected "evenly split," and
one-third of the account value was considered to be allocated to risky assets if the
respondent selected "mostly or all interest eaming." For respondents who did not
kllow the asset allocation within the account, refused to answer the question, or who
had all ocated the assets within the account differently than the choices available, the
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account was treated as if it were split evenly between ri sky and non-risky assets.
Asset allocation was measured in the 1998 wave of the study. Waves prior to 1998
did not contain sufficient information to record asset all ocation.

inheritances. A dichotomous variabl e (I, 0) was used to measure whether the
household received an inheritance from 1992 to 2002, based on the household 's
response to the following question in each wave of the study, "ln the last two years did
you (or your husband/or your wife/ or your partner/ ... ) receive a lump sum of money
or property that you have not already told me abo ut/ Do not include loans or gifts?"
(Institute for Social Research, 2003c , variable #E4748). Inheritances were
specifically identified as one of the answer choices.
The household's intentions to leave an inheritance was measured by its
response to the following question in the first wave of th e study, "Do you [and you
(husband/wife/partner)] expect to leave a sizable inheritance to your heirs?" (Institute
for Socia l Research, 1995, variable #V5349) . The responses to the question were
categorical and inc lud ed the following: (I) yes, definitely; (2) yes, probably; (3) yes,
possibly; (4) probably not; (5) no, definitely; (8) don't know ; and (9) NA. Responses
I through 3 were assigned to their own categories, responses 4 through 9 were
combined and represent the reference category.

Other debt. The amount of other debt was a con tinuous variabl e, measured in
thousands of dollars, and was equal to the all other household debts such as credit
cards, medical , and other consumption debts. Auto loans and investment debts were
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indirectly reported with their corresponding assets since all assets were reported net of
any debt owed for them.

Health status. Health status was measured by the individual's response to the
following question, "Next I have some questions abo ut your health. Would you say
your health is exce llent, very good, good, fair, or poor?" (lnstitute for Social Research,
1995, variab le #V301 ). If the household was married, the average of the respondent's
reported health status was used as a proxy for the household's initial health status in
1992. A dichotomous variab le (I , 0) was used to categorize households' self-rated
health in 1992 as excellent, very good, good, or fair/poor health. Fair/poor health was
the reference category for initial health status.
The change in self-rat ed health status for the household from 1992 to 2002 was
measured with a dichotomous variable (I, 0) indicating whether the househo ld's
health status improved, declined, or remained the same. Those households that
experienced declining health were used as the reference group.

Household size. The size of the household equaled the total of all individuals
residing at the home. In 1992, if a chi ld was attending school , who otherwise would
have li ved with the household, they were included in the household size calcu lation.
Household size was measured in 1992 and 2002.

Age. The age of the individual was measured by the calculated age of the
respondent based on his or her year of birth, or variable number 46 in 1992. If the
household was married, the age of the oldest spouse in 1992 was used.
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Educalion. The education of the household was measured by the response to
the question, "What is the highest grade of school or year of college you completed?"
(lnstitute for Social Research, 1995, variable # 207). The highest year of schooling
comp leted by the individual for single househo lds, or the average of the highest year
o f schooling completed by partnered households, as reported in 1992, .w as used. The
highest year of college completed was top coded at 17 years of educat ion .

MariiG! slalltS. lnitial marital statuses were measured using responses to the
following questions, "Please remind me, are you cun·ently married, living with a
partner, separated, divorced, widowed, or have you never been married?" (Institute for
Social Research , 1995, variab le #225), and an int erviewer designated variable ':Sex of
respondent" (Ins titute for Social Research, 1995, variable #47). Based on the
individual's responses a dichotomous variab le("!, 0) was created and used to classify
the individual as married, single female , or single male. Married households served as
the reference group .

Race or e1hnici1y. The race of the household was measured by the family
respondent's response to the following questions: "Do you consider yourself to be
Hispanic or Lat ino?" (Institute fo r Social Research, 1995, variable #2 16), and "Do you
consider yourse lf primarily White or Caucasian, Black or African American,
American Indian, or Asian?" (lnstitute for Social Research, 1995, variable #22 1).
Using a dummy variable (1, 0), the responses were categorized into Black or African
American, Hispanic, non-Hispanic White, and other.
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The following table summ arizes the variables used in the models and how the
variables were measured. All doll ar li gures are in constant 2002 dollars.

Table 3.1

Measurement of Variables
Measurement

Variable
Change in assets

Assets in 2002 minus assets in 1992 (in OOOs)

Change in total resources

Tota l resou rces in 2002 minus total resources
in 1992 (in OOOs)

Househo ld leverage
Leverage rat io

The sum o f all outstand ing debt secured by the
primary or secondary resid ence divided by the
household's assets or total reso urces (x 1000)

Change in mortgage debt
Paid off

1 if mortgage debt in 1992 was greater than
zero and eq ual to zero in 2002, 0 otherw ise

Kept or incuned

1 if mortgage debt in 2002 was greater than
zero, 0 otherwise

No debt (reference)

1 if mortgage debt was zero in 1992 and 2002,
0 otherwise

Leverage ratio squared

Square of 1992 leverage ratio

lncome and work
lncome
Work status

Total household income reported in 1991
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Variable
Working to not working

Measurement
I if at least one respondent in the household
was working in 1992 and no respondents were
working in 2002, 0 otherwise

Not working to working

I if no respondents in the household were
working in 1992 and at least on respondent
was working in 2002, 0 othenvise

Not working to not working

I if no respondents in the household were
working in 1992 or 2002, 0 otherwise

Working to working
(reference)

I if at least one respondent was working in
1992 and 2002, 0 otherwise

Initial wealth and portfolio
lnitial percentile of total
resources
25'h to so•h

I if the household's total resources in 1992
were greater than or equal to the 25 'h
percentile for the total sample and less than
the 50'h percentil e for the total sample, 0
otherwise
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Measurement

Variable
50'' to 75"

1 if the household's total resources in 1992
were greater than or equal to the 50'"
percentile for the total sample and less than
the 75 '" percenti le for the total sample, 0
otherwise

75'' to 90''

1 if the household ' s total resources in 1992
were greater than or equal to the 75'"
percen tile for the total sample and less than
the 90'" percentile for the total samp le, 0
otherwise

90'" to I 00'"

1 if the household ' s total resources in 1992
were greater than or equal to the 90'"
percentile for the total sample, 0 otherwise

0 to 25'" (reference)

I if the household's total resources in I 992
were less than the 25 '" percentile for the total
sample, 0 otherwise

Risky asset allocation

Total ri sky assets I (Total assets minus net
housing assets)

Amount of other debt

Cred it card, medical , and other consumption
debt (in OOOs)

Inheritance
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Variable
Received inheritance

Measurement
I if the household received an inheritance
between 1992 and 2002, 0 otherwise

Lik elihood of leaving a sizable

Expected likelihood of leaving an estate

estate

measured on a continuous scale from 0 to I 00

Definitely

I if the household definitely expects to leave a
sizab le estate, 0 otherwise

Probably

I if the household probably expects to leave a
sizab le estate, 0 otherwise

Possibly

I if the household possibly expects to leave a
sizable estate, 0 otherwise

Not likely (reference)

1 if the household does not expect to leave a
sizeable estate, 0 otherwise

Health
Initial health status
Excel lent

I if the average self-rated health status is
excellent in 1992, 0 otherwise

Very good

I if the average self-rated health status is very
good in I 992 , 0 otherwise

Good

I if the average self-rated health status is good
in 1992, 0 otherwise

Fair or poor (reference)

I if the average self-rated health status is fair
in 1992, 0 otherwise

Change in health status
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Variab le
No change

Measurement
1 if self-rated health was unchanged in 2002
compared to 1992, 0 otherwise

Im proved

I if self- rated health in 2002 was hi gher than
self-rated hea lth in 1992, 0 otherwise

Declined (reference)

1 if self-rated health in 2002 was less than
self-rated health in 1992, 0 otherwise

Demographics
Household size

Total number of individual residing in the
household

Change in househo ld size
increased

1 if household size in 1992 was less than the
househo ld size in 2002, 0 otherwise

Decreased

I if household size in 1992 was greater than
household size in 2002, 0 otherwise

Constant (reference)

! ifhousehold size in 1992 was equal to

househo ld size in 2002, 0 otherw ise
Age

Age of ind ividual, or oldest spouse, in 1992

Educati on

Hi ghest grade of schooling completed by
individual, highest average grade compl eted
for marri ed household s

Marita l statu s
Single fema le

I if househo ld was a si ngle fema le in 1992, 0
otherwise
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Measurement

Variable
Single male

I if household was a si ngle male in 1992, 0
otherwise

Married (reference)

I if household was married or living together
in 1992, 0 otherwise

Race/ethnicity
African American

I if househo ld head is African American, 0
otherwise

Hispanic

I if household head is Hispanic, 0 otherwise

Other

I if household head is Other, 0 otherwise

Non-Hispanic White

I if household head is non-Hi spanic White, 0

(reference)

otherwise
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

Th is chapter presents th e results of the empirical analysis. The chapter begins
w ith a discussion of the sampl e characteri stics. The next secti on reports the results of
independent /tests comparing unleveraged and leveraged households across
continuous variab les. This section is followed by the resu lts of the chi-square tests for
independence on categorical variables. The chapter conclud es w ith a presentation of
the regression models generated for each of the dependent vari ab les.

Sample Characteri stics

The fin al sampl e of co ntinuously participating households with constant
marital sta tu ses from 1992 to 2002 with housing assets consisted of 3,060 households.
As a resu lt of missing valu es ford fin ed benefi t and defined contribution pensions, an
additiona l 2 12 and 53 cases, respectively, were dropped from the sample. Fifteen
households refused to report th ei r work status in 1992 and 2002, these were also
dropped from the final sampl e. Ten addi tional cases were treated as influential
leverage cases and elimin ated from th e sample. The final samp le consisted of2,770
househo ld s. All doll ar figures were adjusted to be 2002 equivalent dollars. For
sampl e stati stics, means testing, and chi-square tests, the 1992 household
weights- included with the data set- were applied to th e households . Household
weights provided by HRS were not app li ed in the regress ion analysis.
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Average househo ld assets increased substan tially over the period of
observation. Mean assets increased $405,510. The median hou sehold 's assets
increased S 179,2 50. Based on the observed stand ard deviation for th e results, there
was substantial variation among household s in tenn s of both abso lute and percent
increases. In contrast to hou sehold assets, average total reso urc es avai lable to the
house decreased by $270,780. Simil ar to household assets, substantial variation
across households was observed. These results are summarized in Tab le 4.1.
The increase in assets and the si multan eous decrease in total resources was
consistent w ith the life cycle income hypothesis, in that prior to retirement,
househo ld s accumulated assets, however, their human capital- measured by the
present value of future eam ings-declined as a result of fewer anticipated years of

Table 4.1

Descriptive Stalislicsfor Changes in Assels and Total Resources from 1992 lo 2002
ei hied)
Dependent Variables

Mean (Median)

SD

Assets (OOOs)

1992

401.97 (220.24)

65 1.03

2002

807.48 (465.94)

I ,452.98

Change in assets

405.51 (179.25)

1,289.55

1992

I ,544.50 (I ,087.16)

2,043.3 4

2002

1,273.7 1 (793.36)

2,254.67

Total resources (OOOs)

Change in total resources

-270. 78 (-272.28)

1,313.92
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work. The present value of public and private defined benefit pensions was also
reduced as the household ages because they have fewer years left to draw on life
pensions. A breakdown of total resources is presented in Table A.l of the Appendix.
lnitial amounts of mortgage debt and changes in that debt were reported in
Table 4.2. Ju st Jess than one third of the sample reported no mortgage debt in 1992
and 2002. Over the period of observation 43.95% of households kept or incurred
mortgage debt wh il e 25.49% decreased their mortgage debt.
Average household income from all so urces in 199 1 was $70,796, as reported
in Tab le 4.3 . The hi gher income was a resu lt of the samp le selection process. The
average all ocati on of non-housing assets to risky assets was 34.69%.
The median percentage of assets al located to ri sky investments was 30.77.
More than one fifth of the households received an inheritance during the period of
observati on and 14.59% of households, when asked in 1992, definitely planned

Tab le 4.2

Descriptive Statistics for Mortgage Debt (i-om 1992 to 2002 (Weighted)
Variables
1992 Housing debt (OOOs)
Mortgage debt to assets (x I ,000)

Mean (Med ian)

SD

44.45 ( 15.40)

81.82

148.05 (57.44)

203. 18

%

Change in housing debt
Paid off

25.49

Kept or borrowed

43 .95

No housing debt'

30.56

'Reference category.
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to leave a sizab le estate to their heirs, whereas 49.55 % thought that it was not likely
that they wou ld leave a sizable estate. Median househo ld consumer debt was zero in
1992.
Self-rated health and ot her demographic variab les are reported in Tabl e 4.4.
The majority of households in the sample reported hav ing "Excellent" or "Very
Good" health with only 13.66% reporting "Fa ir or Poor" hea lth, as shown on Table

Tab le 4.3

Descriplive S!afislics far Household Income, Risky Assels, 01her Deb!, and
lnherilcmces from 1992 lo 2002 (Weighled)
Variables
1991 income (OOOs)

Mean (Median)
70.80 (56.46)

SD

%

64.75

Work trend
41.3 6

Working 1992: not working 2002

2.05

Not working 1992 : working 2002
Not working 1992: not working 2002

14.36

Working 1992: working 2002'

42.23

Ri sky assets to total assets (x 100)
1992 other debts (OOOs)
Received inheritance

34.69 (30.77)

30.79

3.29 (0.00)

14.56
2 1.89

Plan to leave sizable estate
Definitely

14.59

Probably

19.38

Possibly

16.28

Not likely'

49.55

' Reference category.
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4.4. Self-reported health status in 2002 was unchanged for 49.11% of the sample. A
large percentage, 39.04%, of the sampl e reported lower self-rated health in 2002 than
in 1992. This was not surprising given that these households were 10 years older and
the high percentage of households reporting "Exce llent" or "Very Good" health in
1992.

Tab le 4.4

Descriptive Statistics for Household Health and Demographics from 1992 to 2002
(Wei hted)
Mean
Variables

(Median)

SD

%

1992 self-reported health status
14.20

Excellent
Very Good

40.81

Good

31 .33

Fair or Poor"

13.66

Change in self-reported health
No change

49.10

1m proved

11.86

Decl ined'

39.04

1992 household size

2.40 (2 .00)

1.03

Change in household size
Increased

11.39

Decreased

28.73

Constant'

59.88

1992 Age

57.59 (57.00)

4.55
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Mean
Variables
1992 Education

(Med ian)

SD

12.82 ( 12.50)

2.60

%

Coupled status
15.95

Single female

5.56

Single male

78.49

Man·ied or partnered'
Race
Black or African American

6.82

Hispanic

3.94

Other

1.86

Non-Hispanic White'

87.38

' Reference category.

The average household size was 2.40 individuals per household . The
relatively large household size for this age group was a result of the restriction placed
on the ending sample. The average age of the household in 1992 was 57.59 years old.
This was sli ght ly older than the midpoint of the HRS sample because spouses of ageel igibl e indiv iduals were included in the hou sehold sample. The average education of
th e household indicated some post-secondary education for the individuals. The
majority of the sample was married whi le single men accounted for only 5.56% of the
group. The samp le was overwhelmingly non-Hi spanic White.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the mean and median trends in household assets
and total resources, respectively, for the period of observati on . An upward-sloping
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trend was observed for average and medi an household assets. Both mean and median
household assets experienced increases over the period 2000 to 2002. During this
same period, the overall U.S. econom y was stagnant and equity investments were
generally declini ng in value. However, bond values increased dramatically during this
period as a result of falling interest rates and weak stock market perforynance. Home
prices also experienced substantial increases during this time period.
While household s did well during th e 2000 to 2002 time period , the median
households' assets experienced mod est growth from 1994 to 2000, a period which saw
excepti onal growth in th e stock market. The counter intuitive trend in assets during
times of rapid gains and losses in the stock market suggests that househo lds in this age
group ho ld fairly conservative portfolios. The majority of the sample's non-housing
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assets were not allocated to ri sky assets, such as stocks, but rather were held in more
co nservative investments, such as bonds. The ratio of risky assets to non-h ousing
assets strengthens this explanation.
IJ1 contrast to Figure 4.1 is Figure 4.2 , which shows a steady decrease in the
total resources of the household at both the mean and median

measure~.

The most

influential factor contributing to the steady decline of total resources was the samp le' s
age. As the sample aged, the present va lue of future eamings and public and private
defined benefit pension plans decreased. It appears that for househo lds in this age
group , th e decline in total resources as a resu lt in age occurred at a greater rate than
the increase in assets used to offset the loss of wages during retirement.
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Figure 4.3 depicts the mean and median trend in mortgage debt during the
period of observation. Two groups of househo ld s are apparent in Figure 4.3 , namely,
those households with mortgage debt, versus those households without mortgage debt.
Jn 2002 do ll ars, average mortgage debt has remained relati vely constant. However, as
seen in Table 4.8, the percentage of households with zero mortgage debt in 2002 was
hi gher than in 1992, yet the average mortgage debt appears to be stable. As shown in
Table 4.6, the average amount of mortgage debt, in real terms, for borrowing
households increased substant iall y from 1992 to 2002.
Complementing Figure 4.3 is Figure 4.4, which shows the mean mortgage debt
to assets ratio and mean mortgage debt to total resources ratio over the time period.
Whil e average mortgage debt appeared to remain constant, the rati o of mortgage debt
to assets steadi ly declined as a res ult of the rising value of household assets .
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Figure 4.3. Mortgage debt (OOOs) from 1992 to 2002 (weighted).
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ln general, even households that did not pay down their mortgage debt during the time
period saw their leverage ratios fall.
The trend in mortgage debt to to tal reso urces initially follows the ratio of
mortgage debt to assets, however, as th e sample aged and total resources were
depleted more rapidl y than assets were accumul ated, the household began to become
more leveraged. This is the opposite of the mortgage debt to assets ratio and b~in gs to
li ght the increasing leverage that older househo ld s take on when mortgage debt is held
constant.
Figure 4. 5 depicts selected age col1ort s and the average amount of mortgage
debt carri ed by each household for each year of observation. The age of the cohort
was as of 1992. The amo unt of mortgage debt fell for each cohort during the
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first years of observation. The oldest cohort' s debt continued to decrease while the
younger cohorts' average mortgage debt increased and decreased more sporadically
over the remainder of the period. The youngest cohort consistently had the highest or
near highest debt loads relative to the other coh011s while the oldest cohort
consistentl y had the lowest amounts of mortgage debt. The differences between
cohorts are consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis in that younger
households carry more mortgage debt than older households.
Younger cohorts appeared to be more responsive to changes in interest rates
than older cohorts. Historically low interest rates from 2000 to 2002 appeared to have
motivated younger households to increase their mortgage debt in real tenns.
Consistent with the life cyc le income hypothesis, the oldest households appeared to be
less responsive to changes in interest rates than younger households. However, for
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some old er households the fa ll ing interest rates appeared to have slowed the rate at
which mortgage debt was declining. ln general, the younger cohorts increased or
maintained mortgage debt holdings, while the two oldest cohorts decreased or
maintai ned mortgage debt bal ances.

Comparison ofUnleveraged and Leveraged Households

Independent t-Test Results

The sample was di vided into two subgroups: those household s without
mortgage debt and those with mortgage debt in 1992. The creation of subgroups was
repeated in 2002 . Table 4. 5 con tains the res ults of the ind epend ent t tests comparing
1992 group means along selected continuous variables . Unleveraged households
accounted for 36. 10% of the total sample in 1992. Statistically significant differences
existed between leveraged and unleveraged households. Leveraged househo lds in
1992 were stati sti ca lly signi fi can tly younger than unleveraged households and had
stati sti cally signifi cantly hi gher hou sehold incomes, education, total resources,
consumpti on debt, and househol d size than unl everaged households.
Leveraged households also ex peri enced stati stically significantly larger
decreases in total resources over th e subseq uent peri od of observation. Unl everaged
household s reported statistically signi fican tly higher assets. The hi gher income,
younger age, and higher total resources of the leveraged group may be indi cati ve of a
larger percentage of the subgroup work ing.
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Table 4.5

Results ofIndependent t tests Comparing the Leveraged and Unleveraged Households
by Continuous Variables in 1992 and for the Period from 1992/o 2002 (Weighted)
Households

Variable
Assets (OOOs)

Change in assets($, OOOs)

Total resources (OOOs)

Change in total resources($ , OOOs)

Mortgage debt (OOOs)

1991 household income (OOOs)

Risky asset allocation (%)

Other debt (OOOs)

Un leveraged

Leveraged

(36. 10%)

(63.90%)

Mean

Mean

(SD)

(SD)

438.05

381.59

(693.79)

(624.85)

349.85

436.94

(1,178.80)

(I ,3 47.36)

1,314.85

1,674.18

(2,396.33)

(1 ,80 1.70)

-151. 65

-338.06

(I ,033.58)

(I ,444.38)

0.00

69.55

(0 .00)

(93.43)

57.06

78. 55

(57.98)

(67.06)

33.43

35.40

(30.49)

(30.95)

1.72

4.17

(11.93)

(I 5.79)

1 score

2.30*

-1.79

-4.68***

3.77***

-24.68***

-8.9 1***

-1.70

-4.49** *
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Variable
1992 household size

Age

Education level

Mean

Mean

(SD)

(SD)

t score

2.26

2.49

-5.80***

(0.93)

( 1.08)

58.83

56.88

( 4.80)

(4.25)

12.20

13.1 7

(2.70)

(2.48)

11.60***

-1 0.12***

*p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001.

Table 4.6 compares un leveraged and leveraged households in 2002 along the
same variables used in Table 4.5 . l.n 2002 , 56.06% of the sample had no mortgage
debt. There were no statistically significant differences in the amount of assets held or
the change in assets over the preceding period of observation between the two groups.
Several of the differences observed in 1992 remained in 2002 . Leveraged households
continued to be statistically significantly younger and also have higher household
incom es, education, and househo ld size. In 2002, leveraged househo lds did not have
sta tistically sign ificant ly different total resources than unleveraged households,
however, leveraged households experienced a statistically significantly larger decrease
in total resources during the preceding I 0 years compared with unleveraged
households. Leveraged househo lds had statisticall y significantly more consumer debt
in 2002 than unleveraged hou seholds.
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Table 4.6

Results of independent t rests Comparing the Leveraged and Unleveraged Households
bJ! Continuous Variables in 2002 and for the Period (rom 1992 to 2002 (Weighted)
Households
No debt
(56.06%)

Variable
Assets (OOOs)

Mean

(SD)

(SD)

86 1.61

738.43

444.01
(I ,500.07)

Total resources (OOOs)

Change in total resources($, OOOs)

Mortgage debt (OOOs)

2001 household income (OOOs)

Risky asset all ocat ion (%)

Other debt (OOOs)

(43.94%) .

Mean

(1 ,7 17.49)
Change in assets($, OOOs)

Debt

2.32*

(1,017.10)
356.4 1

1.86

(954.35)

1,264.67

1,285.25

(2,682.83)

(1 ,546.1 2)

-123.00

-459.26

( 1,40 1.45)

( 1,166.65)

0.00

79.76

(000)

( 108.65)

62.11

80.4 1

(97 .72)

(96. 17)

33.98

35.60

(30 .39)

(3 1.29)

2.53

4.37

(19. 12)

t score

(17.25)

-0.25

7.07** *

-30.34** *

-5 .17***

- 1.45

-2.76**
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Variable
2002 household size

Age

Educati on in years

Mean

Mean

(SD)

(SD)

2.08

2.31

(0.80)

(1.06)

58.54

56.36

(4.65)

(4 .11 )

12.53

13.19

(2.62)

(2.53)

1 score

-6.93***

13.53***

-7.04***

*p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001.

Chi-square Tests of Independence

Simi lar to the analysis perfonned for continuous va riabl es in 1992 and 2002,
chi-sq uare tests of independence were perfonned comparing unleveraged and
leveraged households in 1992 and 2002 for categorical variables. The results shown
in Tab le 4. 7 are similar to those shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in that stati sti cally
signifi cant differences between unleveraged and leveraged households ex isted.
Leveraged household s differed fro m unl everaged households based on their
wo rk trend over the peri od of observati on, whether th ey received an inheritance during
the period of observation, initial tota l resources, bequest ex pectations, self-rated
health , changes in health status, changes in household size, and race. Consistent with
the res ults presented in Table 4.5, leveraged households were more likely to be
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Table 4.7

Results of Chi-Square Tests af Independence Comparing the Leveraged and
Unleveraged Households by Categorical Variables in 1992 and for the Period from
1992 to 2002 (Weighted)
Households
No debt

Debt

(36 .10%)

(63.90%)

15.29

60.14

0.00

39.86

84.71

0.00

Working to not working

43 .3 1

40.27

Not worki ng to work ing

2.46

1.80

Variable

2,408.94*** ,2

Change in mortgage debt
Kept or borrowed
Paid off
No mortgage debt'
Work status

98.40***' 3

Not working to not working

21.38

10.37

Working to working'

32.85

47.56
109.00***, 4

Initial total resources percentile
25'h to 50'h

24.9 1

24 .09

50'h to 75'h

2 1.45

24.55

75'h to 90'h

10.64

15.97

90'h to 1OO'h

5.45

12.69

37.55

22.70

18.91

23.57

0 to 25'h'
Received inh eritance

x2, df

8.95**, I
2 1.83*** , 3

Likelihood of leaving an estate
13.71

Definitel y

16. 11

Probably

21.11

18.39

Poss ibly

17.65

15.51
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No debt

Debt

45.13

52.39

Excellent

9.91

16.64

Very good

36.9 1

43.04

Good

34.91

29.28

Fair or poor'

18.27

11.04

Variable
Definitely or probably not'

62.92***' 3

lnitial health status

6. 19*, 2

Change in health status
Maintained

51 .59

47.71

Improved

12.10

11.71

Declined'

36.31

40.58
30.26***, 2

Change in household size
In creased

9.91

12.22

Decreased

23.73

31.54

No change'

66.36

56.24

Coupled status
Single female
Single male
Married'

1.61' 2
17 09

15 .31

5.45

5.60

77.45

79.10
17 .30**, 3

Race
7.76

African American

5.18

Hispanic

5.09

3.29

Other

1.1 8

2.26

88.55

86.70

White'
' Reference category.

*p < .05., **p < .0 1., ***p < .001.

x',df
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work ing in 1992 and 2002 than un leveraged households. Higher proportions of
unleveraged households reported not working in both 1992 and 2002.
Stati stica ll y significant differences in initial total resources also distinguished
the two gro ups. Consistent with results fro m Table 4.5, hi gher proportions of
leveraged households were observed in the highest two total resources percentile
brackets, whereas, larger proportions ofunleveraged househo lds were observed in the
lowest percentile category. Leveraged househo lds were much more likely than
un leveraged households to have received an inheritance during the time period.
Expectations to leave a sizable estate were higher among unleveraged households
Higher percentages of leveraged households reported "Excellent" or "Very
Good" hea lth as well as ex periencing a decli ne in health over the period. The number
of individuals in a hou sehold was less stab le among leveraged household s than
unleveraged households d uring the period of observati on with larger proport ions of
leveraged househo lds experiencing an increase or decrease in household size relative
to unleveraged households . Higher percentages of Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites were observed in th e unleveraged group whil e African Americans and Other
races were over represented among leveraged hou sehold s.
Several of the difference in categorical variables th at were observed in 1992
between leveraged and unleveraged households continued to be observable in 2002.
Table 4.8 presents the results of chi-square tests of independence on the same
categorical vari ab les in 2002 . Statistica ll y signifi cant di fference remained in work
status trends, initial total resources, bequest expectations, health statu s, changes in
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household size, and race. Looking back over the period from 2002, stat istically
significant differences in coupled status were also observable with higher percentages
of single households categori zed as unleveraged and married households belonging to
the leveraged group.
Over half of the leveraged households in 2002 reported workin_g in 1992 and
2002 and only 33.90% of unleveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002.
Leveraged households were more likely to be working than unleveraged households .
Comp lementing the household ' s work status was its abili ty to work. Higher
proportions of leveraged households continued to report "Excell ent" or "Very Good"
health relative to unleveraged households.
Similar to differences observed in 1992, larger proportions of leveraged
households belonged to higher initial total resources percentiles than unl everaged
households. This was largely a result of leveraged households being much more
likely to be working compared to unl everaged households, thus having higher present
values of future earnings. While leveraged households generally had greater total
resources, bequest expectati ons were more likely to be higher among unleveraged
households.
Leveraged househo lds remained more Jluid than un leveraged househo lds with
higher proportions reporting changes in household size over the period. Statistically
significant differences in the racial and ethn ic composition of leveraged and
unleveraged households remained in 2002. African Americans and Other households
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Table 4.8

Results of Chi-Square Tests of Indep endence Comparing the Leveraged and
Unleveraged Households by Categorical Variables in 2002 and for the Period from
1992 to 2002 (Weighted2
Households

Variable

No debt

Debt

(56.04%)

(43 .96%)

0.00

100.00

Paid off

45.46

0.00

No debt'

54.54

0.00

Kept or borrowed

123.59***, 3

Work status
Working to not working
Not working to working

46.43

34.88

1.76

2.39

Not working to not working

17.92

9.86

Working to working'

33.90

52.88
100.92***, 4

Initial wealth percentile
25 '" to 50'"

27.05

20.99

50'" to 75'"

22.72

24.35

75'" to 90'"

10.71

18.30

90'" to 100'"
0 to 25'"'
Received inheritance

x2,df
3,046 .00*** , 2

Change in mortgage debt

7.20

13.82

32.32

22.55

21.49

22.40

0.37, 1
12.07*, 3

Lik elihood of leaving an estate
Definitely

15.47

13.45

Probably

20.21

18.31

Possibly

16.81

15.62
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Variable

No debt

Debt

47.51

52.62

Excellent

4.34

6.27

Very good

30.70

34.80

Good

41.42

41.22

Fair or poor'

23.55

17.70

Definitely or probably not'

21.57***,3

Health status in 2002

3.37, 2

Change in health status
Maintained health

50. 15

47.80

Health improved

12.24

11.35

Health declined'

37.61

40.85
50.93***, 2

Change in household size
Increased

10.60

12.41

Decreased

24.06

34.68

No change'

65.34

52.91
6.92*, 2

Coupled status
Single femal e
Single male
Married'

16.04

15.83

6.50

4.33

77.46

79.84
16.52**, 3

Race
Afri can Ameri can

5.5 1

8.51

Hispanic

3.93

3.96

Other

1.35

2.46

89.22

85.06

White'

*p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001.,

x',df
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were over represented among leveraged househo lds relati ve to unleveraged
househo lds.
Based on th e results of independent t tests and chi -squ are tests there were
statisti ca lly signifi cant differences between leveraged and unl everaged hou seho lds.
The general difference between the two groups was that greater pro porti ons of
leveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002 than unleveraged househo lds.
This observation was supported by the differences in earned income, work status
tren ds, age, tota l resources, and changes in total reso urces. However, wi th respect to
asset holdings and changes in assets th e find ings were mi xed. Subgrouping
households based on mortgage debt status in 1992 resulted in no statisti ca l differences
in assets or subsequent ch anges in assets. ln co ntrast, subgrou ping househo lds based
on 2002 mortgage debt status and look in g back, un leveraged househo lds had
stati stically signifi cant ly higher assets, however, there was no statisti cal difference in
the change in assets between the two groups.

Rob ust Regress ion Resul ts

The results of the robu st regression analysis were mi xed. The results of th e
logit model used to contro l for non-rand om attrition leading to sampl e se lecti vi ty bias
are reported in Tab le 4.9. The results of the logit mod el were th en incorporated into
the robust regressi on models by way of the independ ent vari able lambda . Based on
lambda ' s significance in th e first model, sampl e se lect ivity bi as was present in the
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model and was corrected. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients were adjusted
to reflect th e inclu sion of lambda and the robust weights in the models.

Table 4.9

Logistic Regression Resulrs used to Comrol for Sample Selecliviry Bias (sample
a//rilion) (rom 1992 ro 2002 (n = 5,869)
Variables

B

Married or partnered

0.238***

Children at home

0.035

SEB
. 0.066
0.030

Age of individual, or oldest spouse, in 1992

-0.036***

0.006

Poor health

-0.450***

0.070

Received welfare assistance in 1991

-0.331

0.172

Northeast

0.008

0.077

Midwest

0.149*

0.068

West

0.170*

0.080

Region of residence

South'
Race
Black or African American

-0.252**

0.079

Hispanic

-0.428***

0.1 06

Other

-0.730***

0.186

2.06***

0.326

Non-Hispanic White'

Constant

x'
-2 log likelihood

180.31***
7,945.11

'Reference category. *p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001 .

108
Table 4.10 presents the results for the estimated model for absolute changes in
household assets. The first column of numbers in Table 4.10 is the estimated
coe ffici ent and significance obtained using OLS regression. The next three columns
report the estimated model using robu st regression. Both models were presented so
that differences in the two models can be observed. The reported R 2 value is only
appli cable to the OLS results. The R2 va lue for robust regression is not directly
comparab le to OLS results and was not reported.
Keeping or incurring mortgage debt, relative to households that did not have a
mortgage over the period, was statist ically significant and negati vely related to
changes in assets. Households that kept their mortgage debt or incurred new mortgage
debt had assets dec line $62 ,8 50 compared to households without mortgage debt in
1992 and 2002, all other factors held co nstant. Nei th er initial mortgage debt, or the
square of initi al mortgage debt were statistica ll y significant. Paying off mortgage debt
during the period was not stat isti cally di fferent fro m not having a mortgage during the
period.
Total hou sehold income in 1992 was stati sticall y significant and positively
related to changes in total household assets. Beginning the period with one or more
respondents working and ending th e period with all household respo ndents retired ,
compared to households that began and ended the period working, was statisticall y
signifi cant and positively related to changes in assets.
Receiving an inheritance, re lat ive to not receiving an inheritance, was
positively associated wi th changes in assets. The household's initial total resources
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Table 4.10

Robust Regression Results for the Change in Household Assets from 1992/o 2002
(n=2, 770
Robust

OLS
Variables

B

B

SEE

t score

Household leverage
1992 debt ratio (x I 000)

-0.17

0.06

0.43

0.17

-2 .25

-26.81

19.24

-1.38

-168.83*

-62.85

18.89

-3.31 **

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.16*

0.78

0.18

4.39***

Change in ratio'
Paid off
Kept or borrowed
1992 debt ratio squared

-0.08

Income and work
1991 income (in OOOs)
Work status (working to working")
Working to not working

100.88

60 04

14.40

4.16***

Not working to working

81.39

32.52

41.16

0.78

166.39

36.65

20.92

1.77

25'h- 49'h

-2.15

-6.27

18.15

-0.34

50'h - 74'h

40.41

10.10

20.14

0.51

75'h- 89'h

65 .95

27.62

24.84

1.11

90'h -100'h

277.70*

58.32

32.05

1. 81

-0.15

-0.11

0.27

-0.42

-0.61

0.46

-1.30

40 .36

15 .99

Not working to not working
l11iti al wealth and portfolio
1992 total resources (0 - 25'h ' )

Risky assets to total assets
1992 other debts (in OOOs)

6.66***

Inheritance
Received inheritance

76.54

2.51 *
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OLS
Variables

B

Robust
B

SEB

t score

19. 10

1.15

Leave estate (not likely')
Defi nit ely

157.1 9

22.34

Probably

111.18

18.53

16.79

1.10

Possib ly

47.23

-4.70

17.48

-0.28

Health
1992 health (fair or poor')
Excellent

-0.99

-13.93

33. 19

-0.42

Very good

-80.94

4.68

27.85

0.1 6

Good

-58.84

-20.82

24.58

-0.85

No change

53.58

29.90

14.77

2.00*

Improved

80.02

11.49

22.83

0.49

-45.42

-9.22

9.32

-0.99

Increased

- 18.88

8.26

19. 16

0.44

Decreased

45 .60

17. 10

19. 19

0.89

3.96

3.92

2 .34

1.67

24.42*

13 .52

3.37

3.99***

-0.02

0.00

0.01

Change in health (decl in ed')

Demographics
1992 household size
Change in size (constant')

Age
Educati on
Interactions
Debt ratio X educati on

-0.12

Debt ratio X income

0.00

0.00

0.00

0. 19

Debt ratio X risk

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.62**

Debt ratio X age

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.1 I

Ill
OLS
Variables

B

Robust

B

SEB

t score

Coupled status (manied')
Single female

-90.52

-17.48

23.03

-0.76

Single male

-85.45

37.89

33.42

1.14

8.71

4.68

22.42

0.20

-41.74

-11.03

31.96

-0.35

Race (Non-Hispanic White' )
African American
Hispanic
Other
Lambda
Model constant

177.84

38.53

58.86

0.64

-730.23

-250.45

106.76

-2.34*

261.13

-106.54

122.21

-0.86

Note . R 1 = .052 is the model fit for the OLS mod el using unweightcd data. The
corresponding F statistic, F

=

3.92*** , is also associated with the OLS results.

Corresponding stati stics are not reported for the robust model.
'Reference category.
*p < .05., **p < .0 1., ***p < .00 1.

percentile categori zation was not statistically significantly associated wi th changes in
assets in the robust model nor was a household's al location to risky assets.
Initial health status was not a statistically signi ficant variable in the estimated
model. However, change in health status was statisticall y significant and was
substantial ly related to changes in assets. Experiencing constant health in 1992 and
2002, relative to declining health was positively associated with changes in assets.
Households wi th constant health reported a $29,900 greater increase in assets than
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households with declining health . Education was also statistically significant and
substantially related to changes in assets. Each additional year of schooling increased
changes in assets by $13,520, all other things equal.
The int eracti on between th e ratio ofmm1gage debt to total assets and the
households risky asset allocation was positive. This was consistent with the
theoretical model in that households can potentially earn hi gher rates of return than
the int erest rate charged on mortgage debt and wou ld experience a positive net
increase in wealth.
The foll owing model was estimated for the absolute change in total resources,
Tab le 4.11, for the period of observation. Consistent with the previous results,.
keeping or incurring mortgage debt during the period, relative to not having mortgage
debt , was negatively assoc iated wi th changes in total resources. Also consi stent with
the previous model , neither the initial leverage ratio, or square of the initial leverage
ratio were statisti cally signifi cant. Households elimi nating mortgage debt during the
period were not statistically different from hou seholds without mortgage regarding
changes in total resources for the period .
Belongi ng to a household that began the period working and then stopped
working prior to 2002 , relative to those ho useholds working in both 1992 and 2002 ,
was positively associated with changes in total resources. Not working in 1992 or
2002 , relative to households that were work ing in 1992 and not working in 2002 , was
posi ti vely associated with changes in total resources. This is a reflection of the
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Table4.ll

Robust Regression Results for the Change in Household Total Resources from 1992 to

2002 (n

=

2, 770)

OLS
B

Variables

Robust

B

SEE

t score

Household leverage
1992 debt ratio (x 1000)

0.51

0.04

129.92

0.09

25 .37

-12.78

20.45

-0.62

-168.02*

-47.70

20.13

-2.36*

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.53

-0.88

-0.10

0.20

-0.50

Change in ratio'
Paid off
Kept or borrowed
1992 debt ratio squared
Income and work
1991 income (in OOOs)
Work status (working to working')
Working to not working

122.17*

122.67

15.31

8.00***

Not working to working

144.02

81.3 1

45.07

1.80

164.22

22.45

7.3 1***

ot work ing to not working

267.95***

Initial wea lth and portfolio
1992 total resource (0 - 25'h ')
25'h- 49'h

-2 19.88**

-209.64

19.42

-1 0.80***

50'h- 74'h

-3 19.02***

-385.06

21.65

-17.80***

75'h - 89'h
90'h- lOO'h

-585.83***

-658.13

26.26

-25.07***

-1 ,178.76***

-962 .44

34.15

-28. 13***

0.93

0.28

3.27**

-0.02

0.49

37.40

16.98

Risky assets to total assets

1.46

1992 other debts (in OOOs)

8.38***

-0.05

Inheritance
Received inheritance

72.01

2.21*
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OLS

Robust

B

B

SEE

t score

218.19**

52.33

20.36

2.56*

Probably

94.56

61.83

17.90

3.45**

Possibly

I 04.40

16.31

18.60

0.87

Variables
Leave estate (not likely")
Definitely

Health
1992 health (fair or poor')
Excellent

-30.85

-54.14

35.53

-1.53

Very good

-108.16

-33.22

29.83

-1.11

-88.13

-50.66

26.42

-1.92

No change

21.71

23.66

15.68

1.51

Improved

29.54

18.67

24.21

0.77

-45.33

-4.82

10.02

-0.47

Increased

11.80

6.84

20.60

0.33

Decreased

22.90

-3.21

20.45

-0.16

2.76

2.64

2.50

1.05

32.01**

13.01

3.6 1

3.59***

Good
Change in health (dec lined')

Demographics
1992 household size
Change in size (constant')

Age
Education
Interactions

-0.05

-0.02

0.01

-2.14*

Debt ratio X income

0.00

0.00

0.00

- 1.98*

Debt ratio X risk

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.44

Debt ratio X age

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.44

Debt ratio X education
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OLS
Variab les

Robust

B

B

SEB

t

-2.58

49.36

24.82

2.00*

-86.40

5.87

36.13

0. 17

-47.61

-39.36

24.21

-1.62

14.94

-13.20

34.55

-0.39

score

Coupled status (married')
Single fema le
Single male
Race (Non-Hispanic White' )
African American
Hispanic
Other
Lambda
Model constant

256.44

122.81

62.86

1.96

-588.70

-130.08

11 4.9 1

-1.13

-53 .81

-346.01

129.92

-2.66**

No te. R2 = .I 04 is the model fit for th e OLS model using unweighted data . The
coJTespond ing F statistic, F = 8.353***, is also associated with the OLS results.
Co JTesponding stati stics are not reported for the robust model.
'Reference category.

*p < .05., **p < .0 1., ***p < .001.

growth of household assets over the period since non-working households in 1992 had
little or no portion of total resources derived from future earnings. Havi ng in itial total
reso urces in any percentile oth er than the 0 to 25'h was negatively related to both
percent and absolute changes in total resources, largely reflecting the greater ini tial
potential for decreases in total resources.
The household's allocation of non-housing assets to risky investments was
positively related to changes in total resources avai lab le to the household. However,
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the estimated effect of risky asset allocation on changes in total resources was
re latively sma ll.
Receiving an inheritance, relative to not receiving an inheritance was
positively assoc iated with changes in total resources, and based on the robust
regression estimates increased total reso urces by $37,400, all other factors being
equal.
Similarly, bequest expectations were also statistically significantly associated
wi th changes in tota l resources. Compared to households that thought it un likely that
they would leave a sizeab le estate to their heirs, households definitely and probably
expecting to leave a sizable estate were positively related to changes in total resources.
Education was also pos iti vely assoc iated with changes in total reso urces. A
one unit increase in the hi ghest year of schoo ling completed resulted in an increase in
total resources over the 10-year period of$13,010, based on the estimated robust
coeffi cient.
The combination of the leverage ratio and educati on was negati ve ly associated
wi th changes in total resources, while the interaction of the leverage ratio and income
was posi ti vely associated with changes in tot al resources. These results are parti ally
consistent with Maki's (1995) findin gs in that high-income househo lds did benefit
from the use of mortgage debt. However, Maki noted that it was parti cularly highl y
educated high-income households that showed the greatest likelihood of maximizing
the associated tax benefits of mortgage debt. In thi s study, the negative assoc iation
between the combination of the leverage ratio and education is inconsistent with other
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studies. Being a single female household, compared to married households, was
negatively associated with changes in total resources.
Table 4.12 presents in summary form the hypothesi zed and expected results
for each variab le. The initial leverage ratio and square of the initial leverage ratio
were not significant in the mod el, thus no support was found for tradeoff theory in
households. The combination of househo ld leverage with other variables, specifically
ri sky asset allocation and income, were consistent with the hypothesized results and
supported the life cycle income hypothesis. The effects of the combined variables
were consistent with the Equat ions 1.8 and 1.11. Both equat ions were derived from
the life cyc le income hypothesis. Based on these results the life cycle income
hypothesis appeared to dominat e tradeoff theory in exp laining household leverage.

Table4. 12

Hypothesized and Actual Results for Changes in Assets and Total Resources Using
Robust Regression (n = 2, 770)
Assets
Variable

Total resources

Hypoth.

Actual

Hypoth.

Actual

+

0

+

0

Household leverage
1992 debt ratio (x I 000)
Change in ratio'
Paid off
Kept or borrowed

0

+

1992 debt ratio squared

0

+
0

0

Income and work
1991 income (in OOOs)

+

+

+

0
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Assets
Variable

Total resources

Hypoth.

Actual

+

+

Hypoth.

Actual

Work trend (working: working')
Working: not working
Not worki ng: working
Not working: not working

+

0

+

0

0

+

+

Initial wealth and portfolio
1992 total reso urces (0 - 25'h ' )
25'h- 49'h

+

0

+

+

so•h- 74'h

+

0

+

+

75'h- 89'h

+

0

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

0

+

+

90'h - ! OO'h
Risky assets to total assets
1992 other debts (in OOOs)

0

0

Inheritance
Received inheritance

+

+

+

+

+

0

+

+
+

Leave estate (not likely')
Definitely
Probably

+

0

+

Possi bly

+

0

+

0

Excellent

+

0

+

0

Very good

+

0

+

0

Good

+

0

+

0

Hea lth
1992 health (fair or poor')

Change in health (declined')
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Assets
Variab le

Total resources

Hypoth.

Actual

Hypoth.

Actual

Constant

+

+

+

0

Improved

+

0

+

0

Demographics
1992 household size

0

0

0

0

Change in size (constant')
Increased

+

0

Age

+

0

Education

+

+

Debt ratio X education

+

0

+

Debt rati o X income

+

0

+

+

Debt ratio X risk

+

+

+

0

Decreased

+

0

+

+

0

int eractions

Debt ratio X age

0

0

Coup led status (married')
Single female

0

Single male

0

0

African American

0

0

Hi spanic

0

0

Other

0

0

Race (Non-Hi spanic White')

' Reference category.
Retained or incurred mortgage debt duri ng the peri od of observation, relative
to not havi ng mortgage debt, had a consistent negative effec t on changes in assets and
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total resources. The in iti al leverage ratio and square of the initi al leverage ratio were
not statist ically significant in either of the models. The effect of eliminating mortgage
debt, relative to not having mortgage debt, on changes in assets and total resources
was not statistically different from zero.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Discussion of Results

Comparison of Leveraged and Unleveraged Households

Leveraged and unleveraged households were stati sticall y significantly
different from each other in several aspects in 1992 and 2002. A key distinguishing
factor of the two groups was their apparent work status and human capital. In 1992,
leveraged households had higher earned income, education, and total resources.
Consistent wi th Grossman's (1973) find ings regarding health and work, a larger
proportion of the leveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002 and also
reported higher levels of self-rated hea lth. This contributed to the higher amount of
total resources among leveraged households.
The leveraged households in 1992 and 2002 were also statistically
significantly younger, which gave them more time to work and accumulate resources,
th ey also had larger households. The younger age and larger household size of the
leveraged hou seho ld s are consistent wi th the li fe cyc le income hypothesis, as well as
the findings of Hanna and Rha (2000) and Chen and Jensen (1985). The leveraged
households, as a result of their larger initial total resources and human capital,
experienced a much larger reduction in total resources over the I 0 years than
unleveraged households. However, th e more abundant human capital among the
leveraged households provided them with resou rces which could be converted to
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financ ial capital. While the potential existed for greater savings among the leveraged
group, there was no stati stica lly signi ficant difTerence in the change in assets between
leveraged and unleveraged households.
The younger cohorts in thi s study appeared to be carrying more mortgage debt
in real terms later into life than earlier cohorts. Historically low

inte re~ t

rates and

rap idly appreciating home prices may have contributed to thi s. Another factor could
have been that younger households are not as conservati ve as th eir older counterparts
rega rding debt. A greater willingness may have been prevalent among the younger
househo ld s in the sampl e to carry debt into retirement rather than eliminate it. As the
definition of retirem ent is continuously changi ng, younger households may have
anti cipated a longer work ing life, and therefo re may have been more will ing to
maintain or even increase th eir mortgage debt later in life.

1.n 1992, the recei pt o f an inheritance during the observed period was more
lik ely to be among the leveraged households, while un leveraged households were
more likely to expect to leave a sizab le estate. Looking back over the period of
observation in 2002 and categorizing the househo lds based on leverage status in 2002,
there was no statisti cally signifi cant difference between the two groups regarding the
receipt of an inheritance or the househo ld 's ex pectation to leave a sizab le estate.
One possible explanati on of the Jack of difference between the two groups in
2002 w ith regards to mortgage debt, cou ld be th at inheritance monies were used to pay
off housing debt. Some households ho lding mortgage debt in 1992 were perhaps
borrowing agai nst the expected proceeds of an anticipated inheritance. Such
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households, after receiving the anticipated inheritance, then eliminated their debt
holdings. These households, in the absence of the expected inheritance may have
chosen to hold no mortgage debt during the period of observation . Similarly, the
an ti cipated inheritance may also have served as the expected bequest among this
group of households. Further research would be necessary to determine whether this
was the case.
Un leveraged households were also more likely to expect to leave a sizab le
inheritance to their heirs . The unleveraged house represents a large non-liquid asset
that can be bequeathed to heirs during life or upon death. This finding was consistent
with Kao and colleagues' (1997) finding that hou seholds with non-liquid assets were
more lik ely to expect to leave an inheritance.
Initially there was a cultural difference in carrying mortgage debt ; Hispanic
households were more likely to be unleveraged. However, by the end of the
observation period, African Americans were over represented among leveraged
households.
The resu lts were also consistent with Maki 's ( 1995) findings that more
educated higher earners were more likely to incur home mortgage debt because of its
tax advantages. ln this study, leveraged households had substantially higher
household income than unleveraged households. Higher income generally results in
higher tax rates for an individual thus the deduction of mortgage interest on personal
income taxes would also be of greatest benefit to those individuals with the highest tax
rates. The combination of mortgage debt and income was positively related to
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changes in total resources in the robust regression model- all other things equal,
mortgage debt was advantageous in preserving total resources for high income
households.
The stati stically significant difference in consumer debt in 1992 and 2002 may
suggest a greater preference for cuiTent period consumpt ion among

l e~eraged

households. In 1992 and 2002 leveraged households had statistically signi licantly
more consumer debt than unl everaged households. Greenspan's (2003) delineation of
the uses of ex tracted home equity indicates that a large amount of mortgage debt was
used for current consumption. lf mortgage debt was being used for consumption
du ring th e peri od, the observed negative relation between keeping or incuiTing .
mortgage debt and changes in assets and total resources would be expected.
In light of all of the differences taken together, the major underlyi ng
divergence between leveraged and unleveraged households appears to be work status
and human capital of the hou sehold. Those households still working were more
inclined to be leveraged via mortgage debt than those households which were not
working, or stopped working, and have relati vely lower amounts of human capital and
total reso urces .

Estimated Regression Models

The estimated models for changes in assets and total resources provided no
suppor1 for tradeoff theory when exp lai ning household leverage. Neither the initial
leverage ratio nor the square of the in itial leverage ratio were significant in either of
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the estimated models . A positive and concave relation between mortgage debt level s
and changes in wealth was not supported by the findings.
Support was found for the life cycle income hypothesis. The life cycle income
hypothesi s in its simp lest fom1 states that households will dissave or borrow when
youn g, save in middle age, and then dissave in old age . The results of the comparative
statistics and estimated regression models support the idea that households generally
borrow and repay debt in accordance with work and life pattems. While there were
positive benefits derived by some subgroups with mortgage debt, in general
households were better off when borrowed funds were repaid rather than maintained,
in order to potentially accumulate other fom1s of assets. ln this study the life cycle
income hypothesi s was dominant over tradeoff theory.
Based on the estimated regress ion model's results, when controlling for other
factors, keeping or incurring mortgage debt had a negative impact on changes in assets
and total resources, compared to not having mortgage debt. Household leverage in
combination with other variables, such as income or risk tolerance, was positively
associated with changes in assets and total resources. Households which paid off their
mortgage debt during the observed period did not experience changes in total
resources or assets statistica lly significantly different from households that did not
hold mortgage debt during the period. ln other words, those households in the sample
working towards e liminating mortgage debt experienced stati stically simi lar results to
those households that did not have any mortgage debt.
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Initial mortgage debt was not a statistically significant variable in either of the
models. However, what households did with their mortgage debt over the subsequent
I 0 year period appears to have been the important factor relating to mortgage debt.
Households th at paid off their mortgage experienced changes in assets and total
resources stati sti cal ly similar to those households that did not have a 'l!ortgage during
the period. Households that did not elim inate their mortgage debt during the period
experienced less favorable changes in assets and total resources, relative to those
households that did not have any mortgage debt during the period. This is an
enco uraging and important finding for consumers, financial educators, and other
financial planners working with clients who wish to elimi nate their mortgage debt.
In general, household leverage appeared to be negat ively associated with
changes in assets and total resources. However, hou sehold leverage, when combined
with an addi ti onal variable, had a positive assoc iat ion with wealth gains. Highincome households with mortgage debt experienced positive benefi ts from mortgage
debt relating to changes in total resources. Similarly, the combination of household
leverage and the household's allocation of assets to risky investments (ownership
investments) had a positive relation with changes in assets. These positive relations
were consistent with th e theoretical model il lu strat ing the marginal benefits of tax advantaged mortgage debt and leveraged risky investm ents. The posi tive benefits of
the interaction variab les contrast the negative association of keeping or incurring
mortgage debt relat ive to not having mortgage debt. This con trast underscored the
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caution that shou ld be exerci sed when using mortgages to potentially earn greater
tl nancial gains.

ln general for this particular samp le, households would have preserved or
increased assets and total resources best by having no mortgage debt, rather than be
leveraged over the period of ob servation. Exceptions to this were high-income or
more risk-tol erant households that also held mortgage debt. This conc lusion was
arrived at after observing a period of exceptional gains in the financial markets.
Periods of less robust growth in the financ ial markets woul d likely result in similar
and more pronounced results.
The empirical findi ngs of this study regard ing mortgage debt and changes in
assets and tota l reso urces were consistent with th e hypoth etical findings of Waggle
and Johnson (2003). Waggle and Johnson recommended that househo lds ' port folio
decisions should consider mortgage debt, and that for moderately risk averse
households, the opt im al al location to stocks would be substant ially less for households
with mortgage debt. Waggle and Johnson also conc lud e that households wi thout
mortgage debt would be best served by remaining debt-free and not borrowing against
th eir home for investment purposes.
Education was stati sticall y significant in both estimated models and has a very
substant ial effect on changes in assets and total resources. Th e substantial influence
that education has on changes in wealth is consistent with human capital theory
(Bryant, 1990). The education variable may also be capturing other latent
characteri stics of the household as well, such as: type of occupation, household health
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behaviors, financial knowledge, and preferences. Educated households may be more
likely to have less labor intensive jobs allowing them to cont inue in their jobs later
into life. Similarly, health knowledge and behaviors may be more in line with
recommended health practices, providing th em better objective health status than
households with less fonnal education. And finally, education may also influence the
household's knowledge and effectiveness regarding financial decisions and
preferences that result in positive changes in household assets.
There was a statistically significant relation between the interaction of
education, mortgage debt, and changes in total reso urces. Contrary to hypothesized
results and implications drawn from Maki's (1995) results, the relation was negatively
associated with changes in total resources. The negative relation suggests that without
the presence of an enab ling household characteristic such as higher income or higher
risk tolerance, which were controlled for, the combination of mortgage debt and
education was the same as keeping or incurring mortgage debt over the period of
observation.
This study provided some limited support for the health and wealth
connection . Only the estimated model for the change in assets indicated that changes
in hea lth status have an effect on changes in assets . The positive relation between
having constant health and changes in assets, relative to households that reported
decreased health, is consistent with the health-wealth coi1J1ection. Changes in health
were not statisti cally significant in the estimated model for changes in total resources.
The insignificance of health-related variables in the second model may partly have
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been a result of how total resources were estimated. Actual , rather than expected,
earni ngs over the period of observation were used to calculate the present value of
future earnings. !f a household member experienced a loss of health which reduced
their earning capacity over the observed time period , a reduction in total resources
should also have been seen, assumi ng the loss of health was unforseen by the
household . However, since actual earn ings were used over the ten-year period •.
changes in earnings were treated as known at th e beginning of the period, masking the
effect of declining or improving health.
The trend in work status reflected the household's decision to retire or exi t the
labor market, reenter th e labor market, or continue as retired, relative to those
hou sehold s that continu ed to participate in the labor forc e. Ex iting the labor market
by di sab ility or retirement during th e period of observation, or remaining retired
during the period, relative to households that remained work ing during the period of
observation, was positi vely related to changes in assets and total resources. The
posi ti ve relation suggested that working households that later ex ited the labor market
were effective in convert ing human capital to financial or real capital. The conversion
of human capital to fin ancial capital resulted in an overall increase in total resources
available to the household , even though the hou sehold 's human capital, as measured
by the present value of future earnings, had decreased significantly.
Simil arly, ho useholds that began and ended the period as retired had little, if
any human capital, as measured in earned income, that would be lost over the period
of observation. A chart depicting the change in total resources of reti red households
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would likely look more simi lar to the chart shown in Figure 4 .1, than that shown in
Figure 4.2. Strong financial markets over the period of observation contributed to the
pos itive relation to changes in total resources enjoyed by this group.
Based on these results, househo lds similar to those in this st udy wou ld have
been better off to pay off their mortgage debt, rather than use it as financial leverage
for investment purposes. Generally, households appeared to be ineffective in
leveraging themselves for in vestment or financia l ga ins. Debt appeared to be more a
function of life cycle stage-younger, worki ng, larger households-than of financial
leverage for investment purposes. An excepti on to the general finding was th at highincome and more risk-tol erant households with mortgage debt appeared to experi ence
larger increases in total resources and assets, respectively, than did unleveraged
households.
From the standpoint of maximizing resources, maintaining mortgage debt did
not appear to be the best altemative fo r most households. However, for certain
households mortgage debt was benefi cial and enh anced increases in assets and total
resources. Whi le the use of mortgage debt for investment capital had the potenti al to
increase total resources, the household may have derived greater satisfaction from
using the mortgage proceeds for consumption, given their preferences and
ex pectati ons.
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Implications

Some key implications for consumers and financial professionals working
with clients can be drawn from the results. Most notable is that co nsumers and
professiona ls working with most consumers nearing retirement can have some
confidence that mortgages shou ld be eli minated from the household 's portfolio rather
than mai ntained . Househo lds appear to be ineffec tive in using leverage to achi~ve
greater asset gains. However, for more ri sk-tolerant and higher-income households
mortgage debt may help to maximize resources available for retirement. Financial
professionals shou ld refrain from making genera l recommendations, such as in books
or popular press literature or on radio or TV talk shows, that would encourage the
average ho usehold to keep mortgage debt rath er th an eliminate it.
Resu lts of empirical studies cannot be app lied to specific individuals.
Conseq uently consumers and financial professiona ls working with them should
carefully eva lu ate th e client' s ri sk tolerance and capac ity to success full y leverage their
portfol ios, and a decision should be made based on specific analysis of the situation.
As with the results o f any empirical research, exceptions exist. However, the deci sion
to use mortgage debt for in vestment purposes should be carefully analyzed.
Consumers and fin ancial professionals working with clients should also
consider how much of the borrowed funds wo uld be used for investment purposes,
rather than consumption, and how those fund s wou ld be invested. The most
appropriate ex pected rates of retum for comparison woul d be the individual 's own
ex perienced retum, based on their asset allocation mi x. Hypothetical ret ums on
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portfolios not currently utilized by the ind ividual should not be used in the comparison
o f alternatives.
Whi le not included in thi s study, some implications may be drawn relating to
the Baby Boomers. First , younger cohorts in th e study appeared to be carrying more
mortgage debt; Baby Boomers may follow that same trend and continue to carry more
mortgage debt later into life. Second, Baby Boomers may be more com fortable wi th
the respon sibil ity of managing th eir own assets in a 40 I (k) plan and consistent wi th
Engen and Ga le ' s (1997) find ings, may leverage their 40J(k) accounts with mortgage
debt. Third, given increasing life ex pectancies, the concept of reti rement continues to
change, particularly for Baby Boomers who have time to plan and m ake arrangements
for self-defined retirement. Thus, hi storical work patterns may no longer be rel evant
to the Baby Boomers and the rapid decrease in human capital, as m easured by the
present va lue of future earnings, may not be as pronounced in thei r cohort. Based on
the res ults of this study, worki ng households were more li kely to carry mortgage debt
and if Baby Boomers adapt a retirement concept that includes some work , mortgage
debt may be maintai ned much later in life.
Policy implications derived from this analysis regarding mortgage debt and its
favorab le tax statu s are limited largely because of the restricted nature of the samp le.
However, some imp lications can be noted. Mortgage debt in the near-retirement
population is associated wi th negative changes in wealth . To promote self-su fficiency
among a ll househo lds, particul arl y among those nearing or in retirement, policies
shou ld encourage households to eliminate mortgage debt prior to reti rement.
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Under current tax policy, deductibility of mortgage interest may be an
incentive to hold mortgage debt (Dunsky & Fo llain, 2000; Maki, 1995; Stango, 1999).
If the tax code discrepancies in the treatment of consumer versus mortgage debt were
eliminated, households might reduce their overall debt portfolios. The elimination of
incentives, or subsidies, for mortgage debt may be a strong motivation for households
to reduce mortgage debt. Consistent with other studies, this study found that highincome households were more likely to carry mortgage debt than lower income
househo lds. This study also found that high-income households and households with
greater allocations to risky assets derive positive benefits of mortgage debt regarding
changes in wealth.
While the el imination of subsid ies for mortgage interest may discourage
mortgage debt in general, it may also make home ownership a more difficult goal to
achieve for some households. Bourassa and Grigsby (2000) discussed the impact that
eliminating the deductibili ty of mortgage debt wou ld have on home ownership rates,
housing starts, and housing prices. They concluded that a phase out period of 15 to 20
years would be sufficient to minimize or reduce any adverse effects of the po licy
change. Furthennore, they argued that because high-income households are the main
beneficiaries of the mortgage interest deduction, it is unlikely that lower income
households, who have itemi zed expenses generally below the standard deduction, gain
much if any marginal benefit from mortgage interest deductions.
Because of the small effect mortgage interest deductibility has on home
ownership rates, the concentration of benefits among higher income households, and
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the negati ve relation between mortgage debt and wealth growth, policymakers should
seriously reconsider the appropriateness of the mortgage interest deduction. Drawing
from thi s study's findings, a diminishing incentive, or deductibility of mortgage
interest, that wou ld offer the benefits of mortgage interest deductibility in the early
years of home ownership when the interest expenses are the largest, and then
gradually decrease to zero in later years of home ownership, would assist younger
home owners in acq uiring and maintaining a home. A diminishing incentive would
also discourage older home owners from keeping mortgage debt because of artificial ,
and perhaps unusable, incentives.
Implementations of such policies are unlikely because they have the drawback
of adding addi ti ona l complexit ies to an already overwhelming tax code. Additionally,
such policy changes would surely be opposed by significant political interest groups,
such as the banking and real estate industries, which regularly include the potential tax
benefits of mortgage interest deductions in advertising and Joan solicitation material.
Furthem1ore, because of the entrenched status of the mortgage interest deduction in
the tax code, any attempt to change it wou ld require a long and dedicated political
battle.

Limitations

There are several limitations of this study. First, the study is not generali zab le
beyond the population of 51- to 61-year-olds in 1992. Second, while the HRS data
contains a representative sample of 51- to 61-year-olds and their households residing
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in the U.S. in 1992, the sub-sample used for this study does not. Specifically, thi s
study used only households that did not experience a change in marital status during
the period of observati on and that owned a home in 1992. Furthermore, the resulting
sample, even after app lying the HRS provided weights, was not representative of
African American and Hispanic households. Because of this limitation, conclusions
drawn relative to Afri can American and Hispanic households may not be reli ab le nor
representative of th e total popu lation. Even among the remaining sample, nonHispanic White househo lds are over represented relative to their proportions in the
overall popu lation . Genera lizations beyond the samp le population, particul arly to
African American and Hispanic households should be avoided as a result of the
demographicall y non-representati ve sample.
While the study examined the effec ts of mortgage debt on wealth, and how it
was managed, there is no assurance that the households in the sample consciously
made the choice of whether they would carry mortgage debt or not. Furthermore,
whi le some attempt was made to distinguish between household s that carried
mortgage debt for consumption versus investm ent purposes, no clear di stinction cou ld
be achi eved, either because one did not ex ist, or the proxy variable was not adequate
in iso lating the effects.
The original HRS sampl e, as well as each subsequent sample wave, contains
househo ld weights that, when app li ed, generate a nationa lly representative samp le.
Household weights in this study were applied for descriptive and comparative
stati stics; however, HRS provided weights were not applied to the OLS regression
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analysis. Separate weights were estimated for the robust regression analysis based on
the end ing sample's characteristics. HRS weights were not used in the regression
analysis because the end ing samp le was not randomly selected from the original
sample. Because of this, original sample weights may no longer accurately refl ect a
nationally representative sample. The use of robust regression techniques in the data
ana lysis effectively weigh ted the data on the basis of changes in assets or total .
resou rces, wi th ex trem e cases receiving a lower overall weight. The robust weights
may be different from those provided with the HRS data.
The original samp le was also unique because defined contribution plans were
becomi ng more popul ar amo ng employers during the peri od of observation, since the
ri sks associated with retirement in co me were transferred to the employees. Prior to
this point, the traditional defined benefit pension plan was the norm. Under the
defined benefit pension pl an individuals did not need to be know ledgeable about
investments and other financial topics in order to ensure adequate resources at
ret irement. However, with th e increasing popularity of defin ed contribution plans,
employees were forced to leam about investment related topics or naively parti cipate
in their employer's plan. Younger cohorts may have been more accustomed to
defin ed contribution pensions and may have felt more confident and comfortable
assum ing the responsibi lity for managing their retirement assets. Because of this, the
app lication of this age cohort's experiences is limited to those of the same cohort and
shou ld not be extended to younger cohorts.
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The period of observation was also unique. Record gains in the financial
markets were observed , combined with periods of hi storically low interest rates on
mo rt gage debt. Whi le unempl oyment rates were hi storically low, job turnover was
relativel y high and the job tenure of labor market participants was relati vely short
compared to historical job tenure periods (Su ll ivan et a!., 2000) . Mortgage debt could
have been used to smooth the transiti ons in emp loyment. Similarly, because of the
relative short job tenures, househo lds may not have des ired to pay down mortgage
debt when they expected to relocate withi n a few years. These factors could have
sign ifi can tly influenced the household 's decision regarding mortgage debt.
The economy, although relatively stagnant during the last year o f the
observation period, enjoyed a period of unprecedented ex pansion and prosperity. The
period of observation was also marked by rapid increases in bankruptcy filin g rates in
general and foreclosure rat es in certain areas. At first glance tradeoff theory would
help to exp lain the increase in foreclosures and housing related bankruptcies,
however, no evidence was found for this. Whi le there may be similar periods in th e
futu re, no two periods of observation wi II have the same overall experiences, and
subsequent cohorts may experience peri ods more or less favorable than that observed
in thi s study.

Future Research

Future research coul d look more closely at the more risk tol erant and highly
compensated groups separately to detem1ine w hether th ese households have greater
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financial sophist ication with regard to mortgage debt for investment purposes.
Previous studies suggested that these groups were different regarding investment risk
and financial sophistication (Chen & Jensen, 1985; Grable & Lytton, 1998; Gutter,
2000; Maki , 1995).
The association between mortgage debt and emp loyment status found in this
study suggested the need for additional research on the relation between

mortg~ge

debt and transitions from the labor force to retirement. Studies examining the
transitions from retirement back into the labor force may also benefit by including
mortgage debt as an independent variable. ln general, the relation between mortgage
debt and the pennanence of exits from the labor force may also be an applicable line
of financial planning research.
The large impact that human capital exhibited in this study may have hidden or ·
confounded certain relations that otherwise would have been present. Future research
might look specifica ll y at retired households and the effects of mortgage debt on the
change in household assets. Limiting the sample to retired households might create a
more accurate model show in g positive or negative relations which may yield direct
implications for fin anci al professionals work ing with retirees.
The relation between hea lth status and mortgage debt may also be a fruitfu l
area of future research. It may provide a means to examine households, through
observed behavior, to dete1111ine what households are encumbering when they take out
mortgage debt: the home itself, other financial and real assets, or future earni ngs .
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Mortgage debt is an often substantial and unique element of a household's
portfolio of assets and debts. How mortgage debt is managed can have a significant
impact on the financial well-being of the home owners. Recent attention to mortgage
debt reflects financial professionals' increasing awa reness of the important
implications mortgage debt has for households. This study has furthered that
literature wi th an empirical examination of mortgage debt' s impact on changes in
assets and total resources . Future research could continue to clarify and broaden the
existi ng body of literature to develop an accurate picture illustrating the relation
between mortgage debt and the economic well-being of households.
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Table A. I
Breakdown o{Toial Resources in 1992 and 2002 in OOOs (Weighted2

Dependent variables
Housing

1992

2002

Mean

Mean

(Median)
170.58

SD

(Median)

SD

163.40

204.9 1

230.95

(121.90)
Stock, bonds, real estate,

137.77

business, IRNKeoghs

(28.4 7)

Cash, checki ng, CO's,

24.03

gov. savings bonds

(7.00)

Other (vehicles,

32.88

an nuities, life ins. , other)
DC plan assets

(150 .00)
368 .54

60.51

235.87

96.8 1

238.07

22.38

546.62

677.89
(296.06)

607.23

27.90

148 .59

171.72

395.38

(33.42)
150.95

207.31

11 2.24

(207 .33)
121. 11

(0.00)
PV of future eamings

130.03

(0.00)

(243.43)
PYofYA pensions

191.37

(18.04)
108.28

(20.33)
PY of Social Security

60.86
{14.00)

(0.00)
PY of DB plan

914.93

(65.00)

(12.00)
27 .20

293.83

14.79

72.8 1

(0.00)
1,7 11.00

213 .51
(0.00)

1,289.75
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